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#### Our democracy is plagued by Elite corruption and partisan gridlock however Fiat has become religious doctrine within policy debate and we’re all happy to keep playing our game where the government operates smoothly

#### this argument is a Gateway Issue: before you decide whether the plan is a good idea, they have to JUSTIFY their METHODOLOGICAL RELIANCE on Fiat

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I. Introduction

For the political scientist, Baudrillard's work on simulation and the hyperreal is prescient. Politics in contemporary times seems very hollow when compared to the past. In democratic political systems debates on policy have given way to increasingly baroque ideological arguments. The "issues" that resonate the most with voters are generally symbolic or cultural disputes disconnected from economic management or social welfare. Scholarly evidence for this trend continues to accumulate. A good example is the work Lau and Heldman (2009) which builds on earlier research by Lau in (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980). From this perspective politics, at least in the most developed countries, increasingly resembles Baudrillard's interaction of simulacra.

Before his death, Baudrillard frequently pointed out the ironies of contemporary politics. Consider his statement about the French vote on the EU’s Constitutional treaty in 2005: “The vote is fixed. If the ‘no’ side wins the day this time, they will make us vote again (as in Denmark and Ireland) until the ‘yes’ wins. We may as well vote yes right now” (Baudrillard, 2006). Here there is the sense that this is not what politics and a referendum are, but this is what they have come to be. In most of our political systems we see similar hints that something is not the way it was. What are the tangible differences between left and right wing administrations? Would a left or right government in France handle the EU differently? In the United States, Presidents as vastly different as Obama and Bush dealt with the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath with a continuity of policies. So when we vote, what are we doing? What are the actual options we are choosing between?

Baudrillard’s perspective fits well with a growing commentary on the emptiness at the heart of contemporary politics. Zizek in his recent (2008) writing on violence points to the curious demands of young rioters in Paris’ banlieus in October 2005. That is, they did not seem to have any demands beyond the spasm of violence in which they engaged. A similar incoherence can be observed at anti globalization protests. People are angry and want to do something about it. However, they seem unable to coherently explain what it is that has them so angry. The spasms of violence that break out on the periphery of any large protest nowadays also points to a frustration with current politics. Most recently, we have seen the Occupy Wall Street protests successfully capture the attention of a very large audience. However, these protests failed to articulate a coherent political program. In his visit to the group camped out in New York, Zizek pointed out this shortcoming when he was invited to speak. As he put it, “We know what we do not want. But what do we want?” (Zizek, 2011).

If there are no substantive policy differences between parties anymore, then, as Baudrillard would expect, we have to invent some. Witness the entire pop culture industry in the United States devoted to the mythology of Conservatives and Liberals. This industry now embraces books, television, radio, and the Internet, as well as satirical greeting cards in either flavor. Here again is the sense that these examples are not real politics. Instead, we have cultural products that seem to be the very definition of Baudrillard’s simulacra. But how do we know this?

If all politics is just being played out within the hyperreal, that is, politics are just combinations of signs and simulacra, then why do we have a sense that this is not “real” politics? Why do referendums seem so empty to us? Why are we able to organize protests, but then have the sense that we failed to define a “real” concrete program? Furthermore are signs and simulacra powerful enough to inspire individuals to the point of political violence? Baudrillard would most likely argue that violence on the periphery of politics is not inspired by the interaction of simulacra. Instead, this violence represents a frustration and impatience with politics. For Baudrillard, the possibility of a contemporary, active politics is very slim. Thus, we should expect to see indifference or frustration. However, if that is the case, then how do we explain the motivation of some individuals for engaging in this empty politics to the point of extremism?

To explain this tension, we should examine evidence of a politics capable of referencing something outside of other simulacra. A good pressure point for such an analysis is contemporary use of the modern political tactic of detournement as described by Debord and the situationists. Despite evidence for Baudrillard’s analysis of politics as simulation, the modern political tactic of detournement is still effective. If this is the case, then how can this be explained within Baudrillard’s larger analysis of our contemporary situation?

II. Simulations and Detournement

Recently, a colleague expressed some frustration to me when trying to talk to his students about Che Guevera. Although the students recognized his image, they had no clear idea who Che was. As Baudrillard and others would expect, they knew the image of Che from our consumer culture, but could not articulate who he was. Yet, they still knew his image was associated with subversive activities and radical politics.

This sort of incident illustrates an important point about images; they are double edged. Since the image can be disconnected from its initial context, we have the possibility of DeBord and the Situationists' detournement. We can recycle and re cut the image (like the "culture jamming" of the Ad Busters) to create new messages [culture-jamming] that are communicable through the cultural terrain (see www.adbusters.org). On the other hand, given Baudrillard’s description of our contemporary situation, how plausible is detournement since images are indeed detached? More concretely, how far removed can a given image be before it has lost both its "official" meaning and its reprogrammed "subversive" one? Does this problem indicate that we must consider the timing of detournement activities? Must we create the subversive use of the image while there is still a consciousness of the image's original intent?

Furthermore, if there is an element of timing necessary for detournement, then we must consider the following sort of analysis. Why are some images more deeply ingrained with their initial intent? In turn, such deeper images may retain a possible subversive or detournement meaning for a longer period as well. If some images can be used for a longer period, then does this challenge Baudrillard's assertions that there is no meaning left beyond simulation? If there is no meaning behind the image, then why are some still useable in both "official" and "subversive" modes for a much longer period than others?

Does the possibility of detournement mean that there is some truth to our sense of contemporary politics being a simulation of "real politics”? The ability of detournement to expose the real meaning behind advertising and other public statements suggests that we still possess an ability to understand the authentic when we see it. How else can one explain detournement's continuing effectiveness?

Baudrillard indicates in his work Simulations that this is the wrong question to ask. According to Baudrillard: "We are witnessing the end of perspective and panoptic space (which remains a moral hypothesis bound up with every classical analysis of the 'objective' essence of power), and hence the very abolition of the spectacular” (Baudrillard, 1983:54). Thus, Baudrillard thought that we had already entered (in the 1980's) a period later than the society of the spectacle that Debord describes in the 1960's. The idea of any remaining ground or foundation from which one could engage in Debord's neo Marxist analysis has already disappeared according to Baudrillard.

From this perspective, there is no relationship or channel of manipulation to unmask. The relationship between media and us (the audience) has collapsed to the point that Baudrillard sees no space between the two. In, Simulations, Baudrillard speaks explicitly about television (Ibid.:55-58). Already in 1983 he is concerned that reality television meant that there was no longer a subject with perspective. So, to Baudrillard, Debord's analysis is already obsolete because we are no longer an audience to a spectacle but instead we are a part of simulation. Thus for Baudrillard, the real has been replaced by the hyperreal.

However, if Baudrillard is correct, then shouldn't detournement become ineffective? If the distance needed for a relationship like Debord's spectacle has collapsed, then how could the dialectic of recuperation and detournement still be possible? For Baudrillard the answer would appear to be that Debord's concept is impossible. Anything that appears to us now as detournement is most likely a simulation of that process. Recuperation and detournement are collapsed categories just like every other possible anchor in the hyperreal. Indeed, Baudrillard seems borne out to some extent when we consider the efforts of companies and products to establish "street cred". These efforts range from advertising that engages in self-parody to the planting of grass roots reviews on websites. Thus, the idea of detournement, or perhaps we should say authentic, non-simulated detournement seems obsolete.

Debord himself indicates that detournement relies on some sort of ground or context. Hence, his second law of detournement, "The distortions introduced in the detourned elements must be as simplified as possible, since the main impact of detournement is directly related to the conscious or semiconscious recollection of the original contexts of the elements" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). If Baudrillard is correct in his description of the hyperreal, then it is hard to see how this original context can survive.

Yet, despite Baudrillard's criticism, there is evidence of Debord's dialectic functioning in contemporary culture. Writing in the late 1950's, Debord and Wolman argued that a growth in detournement would become visible in the arts through, "an increasingly extensive transformation of phrases or plastic works that happen to be in fashion" (Ibid.:3). This observation triggers several associations with contemporary culture such as the pervasive sampling that makes up current music, books that stitch together different cultural worlds, (such as Pride and Prejudice and Zombies) or television sitcoms such as The Office, which styles itself like a reality program. Furthermore, some images and pieces of culture retain enough meaning that they can easily be turned into a "subversive" mode. How is this possible unless there remains enough relationship and connection to areas outside of simulation?

Perhaps Baudrillard could argue that these acts of resistance are simply wheels within wheels. The evidence we see of Debord's dialectic is simply the dramatic narrative of the simulation we know. With this interpretation, the hyperreal can retain the dramatic elements and themes of an earlier time, even though this is now unhinged from meaning. However, this solipsistic position ignores much evidence from contemporary culture.

For example, we can see the dynamic of Debord's detournement and recuperation at work in several areas of contemporary, popular culture. Consider these recent manifestations of cultural recuperation: Motorcycles and motorcycle gang style- now co-opted into brand named superstores; punk rock and punk rock music- co-opted in the 1990's through grunge and alternative labels; or Goth subculture- co-opted both in popular television and movies and mainstream cosmetics that now feature Goth style colors in lipstick etc. Thus Debord's dynamic of detournement and recuperation seems to still be going strong.

Two intertwining poles of agency explain this dynamic’s motive force. The first pole (or it could be the second) of this dynamo are strategic, market calculations (recuperation revives failing street cred and hence sales). The second pole (though we might prefer that it be the first), are artistic imperatives (detournement carves out a space for creativity and, hence, originality). Yet, where is such agency to be found in Baudrillard's view?

In Baudrillard's broader work the simulacra he describes appear to feed off of each other. Yet this view seems sorely lacking in human agency. In a classic, broad reflection on perception and memory Bergson states, "The function of the body is not to store up recollections, but simply to choose, in order to bring back to consciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the useful memory, that which may complete and illuminate the present situation with a view to ultimate action" (Bergson, 1991:179). Indeed, if the goal of an actor within Debord's dialectic is action, then she chooses some images and symbols with purpose. This dimension of strategy and tactics is missing from Baudrillard's analysis because it is, again to him, the wrong perspective. In contrast, detournement is at its core for Debord, a tool or tactic of class struggle and for defeating the remains of modernism in the arts. Such a program or cause is obsolete to Baudrillard given his view of our contemporary situation.

Another way to pose this difference between the two thinkers is to compare Debord's idea of the "spectacle" to Baudrillard's idea of "the system of objects". The chapter on advertising in Baudrillard's The System of Objects, brings out an important distinction between Baudrillard and Debord (Baudrillard, [1968] 1996:164-196). The discussion develops into an exploration of the mass psychology of advertising. Baudrillard argues that the rational claims made in advertising are not really believed by any of us. Instead, they provide a rationalization for purchases that we desire due to non-rational motivations. Baudrillard sees advertising as a surface phenomenon of the system of objects that we live within. The key difference between Baudrillard's description of this vast economic, political, and ideological system of consumption from Debord turns upon agency.

Debord still sees the spectacle as a force that can be countered with tactics such as detournement. In contrast, Baudrillard sees the system of objects as a more pervasive whole into which we are psychologically integrated. The idea of individual agency leading to some sort of resistance begins to look in Baudrillard's conception like the rebelliousness of a child, rather than the acts of Debord's class conflict.

So, where has this discussion taken us in thinking about politics and the simulation of politics? Debord and Wolman argue under the second law of detournement that it indeed requires a context but that this is, "only a particular case of a general law that governs not only detournement but also any other form of action in the world. The idea of pure absolute expression is dead" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). Thus, for Debord this context can be as mythical, metaphysical, or ideological as its audience is capable of comprehending.

Signs and simulacra in such a context suggest the stage of “sorcery” within Baudrillard's precession of simulacra. Could this be a good way of thinking about contemporary politics as a closed system of obscurantist meanings? From this perspective, detournement could still be alive in pockets of the hyperreal where individuals still participate within a bounded envelope of ideology. Within this context signs can profoundly refer to other signs for the initiated.

On the other hand, how believable is the idea that contemporary politics is an obscurantist system for the initiated, since politics involves mass behavior? Can such a view explain the agency and motivation we still encounter among political entrepreneurs that emerge from the grassroots? How can we explain the efforts at detournement we still see in society from below, as well as successful examples of recuperation?

III. Baudrillard, Debord, and Nostalgia

A possible path of reconciliation between these two positions is to consider Baudrillard's discussion of nostalgia. Baudrillard discusses in several of his later writings the prevalence for nostalgia in contemporary culture. Furthermore, our recent visions of the future seem to be ones where individuals are looking back upon us. The most obvious versions of this nostalgia for Baudrillard are books and films where, in a post apocalyptic setting; the survivors walk around the debris of our contemporary world.

In this sense there is a context in Baudrillard when he examines contemporary ideas of the future. The odd nostalgia he describes comes from us, human agents, trying to imagine the outcome of our contemporary actions. From this perspective, our unease is not due to the style or practice of contemporary politics, but to an underlying intuition about the failure of politics. Contemporary humanity faces the possibility of catastrophic risk. The shadow of ecological disaster is especially present in the minds of most of us.

Nostalgia then is something we feel for what politics was. Perhaps detournement continues to work because many of us long for modern (as opposed to contemporary) politics with its clarity of class conflict and ideologies that revolved around the role of the free market. Thus, we still respond to detournement actions that reference this earlier context. Furthermore, many of us prefer to still practice and participate in politics bounded by this context.

Yet, we suspect that this is simulation, not because it is "unreal" but because politics in this sense does not address the most urgent issues that should be political. Instead, with our politics locked into this modern context, the urgent issues of climate change, pollution, technological risk, and mass scale terrorism become topics for culture. Thus, we see the nostalgia for the "society that was", our current one, in literature and film with post apocalyptic themes.

Nostalgia is also a defense or a coping mechanism. What agency do any of us possess within our contemporary context? Because we sense the futility of politics, as we know it within this contemporary setting, we retreat to behaving as if the old context, with its familiar categories and practices, still exists. Because we behave this way, it does continue to exist but at a cost. We soldier on within a modern politics that is increasingly detached from the constraints (ecological, economic, and biological) of our existence. This closed system of modern politics goes on in a ritualistic fashion, despite our growing frustration, and awareness, of its inability to address our common problems.

Recent commentary that criticizes the whole idea of detournement and Baudrillard’s analysis reflects this desire for politics as it was. In their book, Nation of Rebels, Heath and Potter argue that Baudrillard and Debord have created a closed ideology (Heath and Potter, 2004). From this critical perspective, they argue that there is no system performing recuperation. Instead, by collapsing the categories of the political and the cultural, many on the left have fallen into a bottomless trap. They continue to try and create a counterculture that simply sells more lifestyle product, while failing to attend to “real” politics. Real politics being the incremental policy changes that create results as in the past.

Is this a devastating critique? Or is this nostalgia for the politics that was? The examples Heath and Potter give of positive change, the American Civil Rights Movement, the construction of the welfare state, seem like a museum to us now. Is the context for such political activity still with us? Do we live in an era capable of producing such outcomes?

Instead, politics in this sort of analysis begins to resemble religion in that we appeal to it and diligently perform our duties waiting for an intervention that does not come. Have we not performed our roles earnestly enough? Are we neglecting the rites of our fathers? Do we need to switch to another denomination? Should we blame the clergy? And of course some of us begin to have our doubts that any of it matters.

From this perspective, the post apocalyptic nostalgia so prevalent in contemporary culture voices our lurking fears. In these movies and books, our lurking suspicion that contemporary politics fails to address the "real problem" is realized. This is also a reconciliation of Baudrillard and Debord. Detournement still works because we can access this past context. Indeed, we continue to blindly insist that this past social context is still our contemporary home. When our contemporary attempts at politics founder, because they must confront a very different world today, we try to evaluate their efficacy with this rubric from the past. Why are our governments unable to address the looming ecological crisis? Why don’t our political parties provide us with a range of public policies to choose from?

What do these observations mean for thinking about politics? If Baudrillard and Debord are both accurate in their descriptions, then we seem to be in a moment of political stagnation. The tactics of Debord's detournement remain relevant because we continue to look backward to what politics were. These tactics are successful on one larger point, they temporarily expose our contemporary politics as a simulation of the modern form of politics that was. In this sense, practicing Debord's detournement is a useful activity, but only a first step leading to our contemporary time's pervasive nostalgia. The next step, taking Baudrillard's diagnosis seriously, and developing new forms of politics for our contemporary situation, is a greater challenge (see also Lindsey 2007).

#### And---We must reject state-based thinking---playing into the hands of state elites turns the case and leads to fascism

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Deliberative democracy is a fantasy, and a dangerous one at that. A politics of pure deliberation is the dream of hare-brained philosophy professors who, fetishizing consensus, would reduce all political conflict to moral disagreement, purge passion from politics, and substitute the disinterested and boring experience of jury duty for the vital and indispensable experience of action, and all this just for the sake of theoretical parsimony. At its best deliberative democracy’s moralization and rationalization of politics stinks of a bad nostalgia for a classical participatory democracy that never existed. At its worst, it is a license for an exclusionary politics of elite decision making that silences the voices of the needy and degenerates into a variant of technocratic management from above. [End Page 269]

Or so much of the rhetoric of its critics goes.1 That this caricature of deliberative democracy is familiar ought to be the occasion for some worry. A general skepticism concerning the claims of public reason has seeped into much of the landscape of contemporary political theory, making this kind of easy rejection of deliberation both comprehensible and all too plausible. Yet this kind of rejection is too fast and depends on a straw man account of what deliberative democracy means. The aim of this article is to make the case that this caricature is wrong and that such skepticism about public reason is unwarranted. Deliberative democracy is a robust theory of the political that, at its best, lays the groundwork for an egalitarian and even radical democratic politics. To this end, I propose to read the recent work of William E. Connolly as an expression of political theory’s skeptical critique of public reason. Connolly is exemplary of this wider skepticism in that while he offers a powerful critique of deliberative democracy, his critical alternative is only plausible when rearticulated as a variant of deliberative democracy itself.

Connolly argues that contemporary findings in neuroscience and cognitive science, mixed with a healthy dose of Gilles Deleuze’s cosmological pluralism, reveal a deep, visceral register of human thinking that theories of deliberative democracy overlook at their own peril. Deliberative democracy’s rationalism turns a blind eye to this political unconscious and relegates the theory to an ineffectual “intellectualism,” but, according to Connolly, the left today needs to make this unconscious lower register its fighting grounds if it hopes to hold its ground against an insurgent neoconservative “micropolitics” of media manipulation. This is a suggestive line of argument, but ought it lead to a rejection of deliberative democracy or instead to a more robust and complex account of communicative agency in our media-saturated world?

Connolly travels the first route, but I argue that his alternative to deliberation that he dubs “micropolitics,” a politics of the ordinary that politicizes habits, dispositions, feelings, the body, emotions, and thinking as potential sites of domination and resistance below the register of formal principles and procedures, can only be defended by following the second route. Given the way that Connolly presents the problem of the visceral register there does not seem to be much role for deliberation in his vision of democratic politics. While he often stresses that “intellectualism is constitutively insufficient to ethics,” he strains to remind us that saying this is not the same as saying that deliberation has no role to play (2002, 111). Issuing a series of caveats, Connolly notes that “nothing in the [End Page 270] above carries the implication of eliminating argument, rationality, language, or conscious thought from public discourse” and that he only means “to flag the insufficiency of argument to ethical life without denying its pertinence” (1999, 36; 2002, 108). The goal of his turn to micropolitics is not to replace deliberation but rather to “augment intellectualist models of thinking and culture” (2002, 13). Given the role of affective modes of appraisal in politics, I agree with Connolly that theories of public reason ought to be amended and “augmented” in many ways. Yet, for all his caveats, Connolly’s vision of micropolitical engagement seems to give short shrift to practices of public deliberation. Indeed, his theory only announces their compatibility but does not follow through in enacting it. In what follows, I try to close this circle, so to speak, by demonstrating the deliberative potential of Connolly’s agonistic pluralism.2 I agree that a politics of the visceral reveals the shortcomings of theories of deliberative democracy that prioritize small community meetings and experimental “mini-publics” as the sine qua non of democratic citizenship today, but Connolly overlooks the resources provided by an alternative account of deliberative democracy; namely, a critical and sociologically complex theory of deliberative democracy that aims at revising our self-understandings and provoking self-transformation.

Intellectualism and the Visceral Register

The first step in exploring the potential of William Connolly’s reluctant theory of deliberative democracy is to come to terms with the reasons why he thinks extant accounts of communicative politics are insufficient. Intellectualism, Connolly argues, is the grand failing of deliberative democracy. In accusing deliberative democracy of intellectualism, he is not issuing a by-now familiar criticism of deliberative rationalism. To say that deliberative democracy is guilty of intellectualism is not to say that it is blind to questions of power, or identity, or difference—or at least it’s not only to say this—but rather that deliberative models of democracy are working with a faulty conception of thinking. They have been captured by what Gilles Deleuze calls “the image of thought”—the idea that thinking is an autonomous, linguistically mediated process of mind that is oriented toward coherence and truth (1994, 129–67). Deliberative thinking takes place at one relatively transparent register where our reasons for action can be compared, reasoned about, and revised through the force of the better argument. This image of thought is intellectualist because it fails to see how thought is a layered process of neural, perceptual, and embodied activity not reducible to conceptual ratiocination alone. “Attempts to give priority to the highest and conceptually most sophisticated brain nodules in thinking and judgment,” Connolly argues, “may encourage those invested in these theories to underestimate the importance of body image, unconscious motor memory, and thought-imbued affect” (2002, 10).

Against the intellectualist image of thought, Connolly argues that thinking is distributed across multiple registers that make possible “visceral modes of appraisal” (1999, 27). It is these deep, intensive, and reactive visceral modes of thinking and judgment that the deliberative image of thinking overlooks. Disgust, for example, is a visceral response that makes your stomach turn. It seems to well up inside you without your willing it. The values and beliefs of others can sometimes stimulate this kind of feeling, say, if they present you with a defense of cloning, or euthanasia, or gay marriage, as the case may be. You can’t always put your finger on what it is that strikes you as so disgusting and morally contaminating about such proposals, but sometimes you just feel that they are plain wrong. We’re unable to provide defensible reasons for our responses. Sometimes things just rub us the wrong way.

Connolly’s point is that visceral and embodied responses like disgust, shame, and hatred come to play a role in political decision making—as they evidently do in political deliberations about matters such as cloning, euthanasia, and gay marriage—and that a deliberative approach is poorly equipped to deal with them. Deliberative democrats either require that these sorts of affective feelings are purged from the public sphere as unfortunate distortions of real communication, or they suggest that they can be subject to deliberation and argument just as any other sort of belief, interest, or prejudice can be. Connolly thinks that both of these approaches are bound to fail. Visceral reactions are not conceptually sophisticated thoughts and as such are not amenable to deliberation, argumentation, or verbal persuasion. The exchange of validity claims alone is not enough to stop your stomach from churning when you think about the right to die. Deliberative democrats need to learn “how much more there is to thinking than argument” and to begin experimenting with alternative forms of political engagement (1999, 149). Because political judgment is so often carried out at the level of this visceral or virtual register, deliberation cannot provide a privileged or efficacious form of participation, justification, or transformation.

To corroborate these claims about the multiple registers of thinking, Connolly turns to recent findings in neuroscience that suggest a more intimate relationship between reason, the emotions, and the body than [End Page 272] the intellectualist account assumes. Like some other political theorists, Connolly hopes that a closer engagement with neurology and cognitive science will provide grounds for a more adequate account of subjectivity, reason, and ethics.3 The kind of thinking that intellectualists privilege—sophisticated, conceptual, reflective, deliberative, and linguistically mediated thought—pertains to the activity of the largest part of the brain, the cerebral cortex. It is through the rich and complex layers of neural activity in the cortex that we can perform intricate activities like planning, speaking, reasoning, and arguing. What recent findings in neuroscience suggest, however, is that cortical activity is not autonomous and is in fact in some ways subservient to the parts of the brain that control emotions, memory, and affect.4

In particular, the cortex responds to information from the limbic system, the small curved part of the brain below the cortex that controls emotion and fine motor movement. Made up of the basal ganglia, the hippo-campus, and the amygdala, the limbic system enables the fast, intensive, and reactive action of affects. The jolt of fear that makes one’s hair stand on end or the disgust that we feel in the pit of our stomachs is the work of the part of the limbic system called the amygdala. The sort of reactions governed by this system are an evolutionary necessity for a species that needs to appraise and respond to dangerous situations quickly and effectively without much cognitive expenditure. The decision to jump out of the way of a speeding car needs to happen in a split second. It is not the sort of situation that allows you to deliberate about the relative merits of your different options before acting. But this is not to say that the limbic system is entirely thoughtless. It is not concerned with sophisticated, conceptual, and deliberative thinking, but its actions certainly are symbolically mediated or “thought imbued” in some sense (the expression is Connolly’s). These intense affective responses are not entirely biologically determined but instead take a fair deal of cultural learning. The limbic system in a sense learns or records cultural standards of what is dangerous and what is disgusting and then habituates them as automated response.5

Between the cortex and limbic system there is a “feedback loop” of mutual influence through which these fast, affective, “proto-thoughts” of the limbic system shape the slow, reflective thinking of the cortex (2002). The existence of these intensive, instinctive elements moving below the register of reflective judgment means that human reason is not pure and autonomous but rather is shaped in a complex way at the neural level by the influence of the emotions and affects.6 David Hume, it would seem, [End Page 273] was right to say that reason is in fact the slave of the passions. And what this means for politics is that the emotions and affects that shape and guide thinking are themselves deeply influenced by values and opinions that we may or may not actually want to endorse. Racist, sexist, homophobic, and other ideological sentiments may lodge themselves deeply into this “body-brain-culture network” (2002). Where this is the case, valid and sound argumentation is at a loss to dislodge them and the force of the better argument may be powerless to persuade us to respect, tolerate, or trust each other in the ways that democratic cooperation require. Connolly explains: Culturally preorganized charges shape perception and judgment in ways that exceed the picture of the world supported by the models of calculative reason, intersubjective culture, and deliberative democracy. They show us how linguistically complex brain regions respond not only to events in the world but also, proprioceptively, to cultural habits, skills, memory traces, and affects mixed into our muscles, skin, gut, and cruder brain regions. (2002, 36) This all culminates in a critique of deliberative models of democracy: the inability of practical reason to influence these potentially dangerous or hateful “culturally preorganized charges” points to its undoing. Visceral Politics

Before analyzing the merits of Connolly’s critique of deliberative democracy I want to first situate his charge of intellectualism within its political context. At its heart, Connolly’s objection to the deliberative turn in democratic theory boil down to his belief that too much focus on the terms of justification and legitimation ignores the everyday sensibilities expressed and reproduced in the actions of citizens. These sensibilities are not identical to doctrinal beliefs or articulate reasons; or, as he prefers to put it in his most recent book, spirituality is not identical with doctrinal creed (2008). Rather, the sensibility that determines how it is that we hold our beliefs or “creed” is unreflectively informs this visceral register of judgment and thinking. Where these sensibilities have been cultivated to promote respect, responsiveness, and generosity a pluralistic liberalism can thrive. The political problem, however, is that in contemporary America this noble ethos is largely absent. Instead Connolly argues that this visceral register has become a vehicle for a “stingy” sensibility animated by resentment, fear, and a desire for revenge (1999, 7). The deep roots of existential resentment in an increasingly disempowered American working class today provide the spiritual common ground for the an emerging coalition of competing neoconservative and neoliberal elites who share a punitive and vengeful ethic while disagreeing on matters of doctrine. The resulting theological-corporate-media apparatus Connolly calls “the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine” wreaks havoc on American democracy today as it proceeds to undermine the terms of liberal pluralism and roll back the hard-won achievements of the liberal democratic struggles of the last hundred years (2008, 39–68). Democratic theory’s idea of deliberation seems poorly equipped to confront this threat.

Connolly’s contention is that the failing of the left in America today is due in no small part to its resistance to accepting the role of the visceral register in politics. Instead, it is still caught up in a potentially antiquated search for some better argument that would bring reason and truth together to serve the ends of justice. The American right, however, has been a much better student of the visceral elements of thinking and has crafted an array of strategies that seek to manipulate it to punitive ends. Among working-class Americans who have suffered unemployment with the collapse of the industrial economy, cultural alienation from a powerfully secular and liberal cultural elite, and social fragmentation from the increasing speed, ethnic pluralism, and diversity of a globalizing world, there exists a reserve of resentment to be tapped. Neoliberals and neoconservatives on the American right have overcome their traditional antagonism to draw on this resentment and channel it into a shared spirituality of revenge that vilifies foreigners, immigrants, nonwhites, women, queers, liberals, and secularists.7 Crucial to the success of this resonance machine has been its most powerful echo chamber: the media. Savvy exploitation of new media technologies enable conditions of mass persuasion through which the sentiments of resentment are validated, entering “the thought-imbued feelings of viewers before being subjected to critical scrutiny” (2008, 55), and channeled to political ends. Twenty-four-hour news shows, aggressive and partisan pundits, and the constant fluctuation of terror alerts all combine to excite, code, and steer visceral fear and anxiety. The result is the proliferation of “ugly dispositions” that the powerful media machinery of the right “can foment and amplify, installing them in habitual patterns of perception, identity, interest, and judgments of entitlement” (2008, 53).

Micropolitics as the manipulation of embodied, intensive affects along the visceral register of thinking is a familiar tactic in the repertoire of [End Page 275] commercial capitalism and the state. Marketers and advertisers have long drawn on findings in psychology, neurobiology, and related fields to manufacture the desires their commodities satisfy. Branding is only the most recent affective technique of assuring consumer loyalty in a long history of unconscious and unwilled consumption. Marketers now talk about “low-involvement advertising” that bypasses the higher-level cognitive functions of viewers to appeal to nonconscious mental processing. Similarly, the manipulation of intensive reactions and affect has been crucial in sustaining consent for America’s open-ended “war on terror.” The color-coded terror alert system in place to warn Americans of the likelihood of terrorist attacks functions as a perceptual marker by which public fear and anxiety are calibrated. The aggressive rhetorical tactics, facial gestures, and vocal timbre of conservative media pundits like Bill O’Reilly and Rush Limbaugh as well as the explosive graphics, and fast cutting techniques of twenty-four-hour news channels all have the effect of expressing the spinelessness of the “liberals” they browbeat.8 And the list goes on. Techniques of affective persuasion that function through “sub-discursive modes of communication” are ubiquitous and powerful in the modern world (2008, 66). The challenge of confronting them today, Connolly wagers, means learning to play their game. The left is done arguing. It’s time to learn how “fight fire with fire” (2006, 74).

What Kind of Politics Are Micropolitics?

A more fundamental source of Connolly’s skepticism about deliberative democracy than the findings of neurological science is Gilles Deleuze’s cosmological pluralism. In Connolly’s texts, these scientific and metaphysical sources dovetail elegantly, but one is always left with the impression that the scientific arguments are deployed only to the extent that they readily accord with these more basic philosophical commitments to a deep and radical pluralism in the world.9 Deleuze’s concepts of multiplicity, rhizomes, micropolitics, deterritorialization, and war machines infuse Connolly’s writing and offer an alternative discourse to the allegedly problematic language of public reason. In fact, Deleuze himself, in his magisterial collaboration with Félix Guattari, could be said to prefigure a certain denigration of deliberative politics.10 It would of course be anachronistic to describe Deleuze and Guattari as critics of deliberative democracy, or even worse, as denizens of the American culture wars. But that said, there are passing remarks concerning deliberation in their texts that seem to connect with [End Page 276] Connolly’s claims. More important than decision making and deliberation are the molecular and unconscious forces that open us up to new ways of thinking and experiencing the world. When Deleuze and Guattari do mention political deliberation it is invariably to dismiss it as an example of what they call arboreal, state thinking:

Politics operates by macrodecisions and binary choices, binary interests; but the realm of the decidable remains very slim. Political decision making necessarily descends into a world of microdeterminations, attractions, and desires, which it must sound out or evaluate in a different fashion. Beneath linear conceptions and segmentary decisions, an evaluation of flows and their quanta.

(1987, 221)

A politics that addresses these microdeterminations, what Deleuze and Guattari call micropolitics, is more basic than deliberation because it concerns the boundaries of “the realm of the decidable.” The appeal of reason can only function within existing narrow and rigid boundaries. Strategic appeals to affect, however, can help close or expand this realm and open up new issues to deliberation and participation. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari consider micropolitics as essentially underlying deliberation. Creative becoming, not practical reason, is at the heart of their vision of politics.

How does a democratic micropolitics, then, attempt to reshuffle the rigid segments of a stingy American public culture? Connolly argues that the only way we can achieve a “public ethos of pluralism” is by cultivating the “civic virtues” of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness (2005, 65). If the work of politics aspires to more than a further round in a vicious circle of existential revenge, citizens must first nurture an ethics of “micropolitical receptivity” to the interdependence of their conflicting identities claims in a complex, ever faster late-modern world (1999, 149). To this end, Connolly draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking to devise tactics and techniques of “nudging” or exerting “modest influence” on the visceral register of the self and of public culture more widely (2002, 77; 1999, 29). In some passages, Connolly describes this as the search for “more expansive modes of persuasion,” while in others he appeals to the force of a sort of “mystical experience” (1999, 8; 2002, 120). Yet this dependence on Deleuze and Guattari’s “micropolitics” draws Connolly away from his own best insights and leads him to marginalize the democratic core of a leftist response to an insurgent neoconservative micropolitics. [End Page 277]

Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy provides a powerful tool for theorizing the symbolic meanings and dispositions carried at visceral register of experience. While they do not frame their project in terms of embodied registers or the differential processing structures of brain, they provide an analogous conception of experience, drawing on Henri Bergson’s concept of “the virtual” (Bergson 1990; Deleuze 1988). Emotions, memory traces, infrasensible experiences, habitual gestures, and the unconscious exist “virtually,” such that we cannot always articulate them at the level of language, yet they play a role in shaping our higher-register experiences of the world. The virtual represents a lower register of experience than the conscious and reflective register of ideas, doctrines, and interests. To the extent that A Thousand Plateaus can be regarded as a text of political philosophy, it can be said to be a treatise concerned with political potential of this virtual register as both a site of subjectification and resistance.

Micropolitics is Deleuze and Guatarri’s name for this politics of the virtual. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of micropolitics in their analysis of political regimes. Against the received image of the state as a centralized, stable, and sovereign territorial entity, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the state is better described as a macropolitical assemblage that depends on more ubiquitous, fluid, and supple micropolitical assemblages. The molar organization of the state depends on a micro- or molecular organization of forces such as affects, moods, memories, and habits that sustain and propagate the state’s ends. “In short,” they write, “everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics” (1987, 213).

Despite appearances to the contrary, even the most monolithic and centralized assemblages of power, such as the state, are in fact fluid and lively micro-assemblages resonating together in an only relatively stable manner. Taking the stark example of the fascist state, Deleuze and Guattari make the case that it too is in fact only a decentered plurality that depends on the micropolitics that sustain it:

The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the macropolitical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran’s fascism, fascism on [End Page 278] the Left and fascism on the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.

Their redescription of these kinds of major assemblages of power in terms of their molecular makeup opens up a new strategic awareness of the multiple sites of rupture, destabilization, and transformation through which citizens can challenge them. The fact that the forces animating the macroregister of politics also animate the microregister means that there exists a sort of feedback loop between the two registers, such that action at one level makes for consequences at the other. Because power is not reducible to the authority of the state or any other macropolitical hegemon, local experiments and struggles by citizens, market forces, and media producers have broad cultural and institutional effects on.

To appraise Connolly’s turn to micropolitics it is important to understand what vision of political action follows from Deleuze and Guattari’s original formulation. For Deleuze and Guattari political action is fundamentally creative and reactive. Citizens act by unleashing new forces and energies that disrupt and deterritorialize received molar orders of power and desire. Social movements, thinkers, and dissidents create new practices, new identities, and new values that aim to transform established assemblages. This creative aspect of politics is the first step in destabilizing rigid and reified practices. Connolly calls the proliferation of these dynamic, creative movements the “politics of becoming” (1999, 47–72). To effectively decenter received identities, desires, and self-conceptions, however, these new values have to engage politically with the existing public culture that constrains them. Political theorists following Hegel have described this process as a dialogical struggle for recognition. Deleuze and Guattari, however, refuse the language of subjectivity and of subjects who seek to recognize one another and instead cast the struggle in posthumanist terms as “the flash of the war machine, arriving from without” (1987, 353).

Micropolitics as a model of political engagement is the combat of war machines, nomadic war machines versus the state’s appropriation of the war machine, war machines of the left against the resonance machines of the right. The war machine works through “secrecy, speed, and affect” and represents “another kind of justice” from law or the state. War as armed conflict itself is not necessarily the object of the war machine, but its desirable power of displacement “institutes an entire economy of violence, in [End Page 279] other words, a way of making violence durable, even unlimited.” The war machine is the weapon that the herd or the pack uses to create “smooth space” against the “striated space” of the state (1987, 356, 352, 396, 384). It is continually reconstituted by minorities populating the edges and fringes of the collective body of the state. With it, nomads and barbarians lay siege to the gates of empire.

#### Elitist corporate corruption accesses the root cause of all their impacts

Hayes 12 (Christopher, Editor of The Nation and fellow @ Harvard’s Foundation Center for Ethics, (2012-06-12). Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy (Kindle Locations 34-58), chapter 1)

AMERICA FEELS BROKEN. Over the last decade, a nation accustomed to greatness and progress has had to reconcile itself to an economy that seems to be lurching backward. From 1999 to 2010, median household income in real dollars fell by 7 percent. 1 More Americans are downwardly mobile than at any time in recent memory. In poll after poll, overwhelming majorities of Americans say the country is “on the wrong track.” And optimism that today’s young people will have a better life than their parents is at the lowest level since pollsters started asking that question in the early 1980s. 2 It is possible that by the time this book is in your hands, these trends will have reversed themselves. But given the arc of the past decade and the institutional dysfunction that underlies our current extended crisis, even a welcome bout of economic growth won’t undo the deep unease that now grips the nation. The effects of our great disillusionment are typically measured within the cramped confines of the news cycle: how they impact the President’s approval rating, which political party they benefit and which they hurt. Most of us come to see the nation’s problems either as the result of the policies favored by those who occupy the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, or as an outgrowth of political dysfunction: of gridlock, “bickering,” and the increasing polarization among both the electorate and the representatives it elects. But the core experience of the last decade isn’t just political dysfunction. It’s something much deeper and more existentially disruptive: the near total failure of each pillar institution of our society. The financial crisis and the grinding, prolonged economic immiseration it has precipitated are just the most recent instances of elite failure, the latest in an uninterrupted cascade of corruption and incompetence. If that sounds excessively bleak, take a moment to consider America’s trajectory over the first decade of the twenty-first century. The Supreme Court— an institution that embodies an ideal of pure, dispassionate, elite cogitation— handed the presidency to the favored choice of a slim, five-person majority in a ruling whose legal logic was so tortured the court itself announced it could not be used as precedent. Then the American security apparatus, the largest in the world, failed to prevent nineteen men with knives and box cutters from pulling off the greatest mass murder in U.S. history. That single act inaugurated the longest period of war we have ever known. Just a few months later Enron and Arthur Andersen imploded, done in by a termitic infestation of deceit that gnawed through their very foundations. At the time, Enron was the largest corporate bankruptcy in the history of the nation, since eclipsed, of course, by the carnage of the financial crisis. What was once the hottest company in America was revealed to be an elaborate fraud, aided and abetted by one of the most trusted accounting firms in the entire world.

And just as Enron was beginning to be sold off for scraps in bankruptcy court, and President Bush's close personal connection to the company's CEO, Ken Lay, was making headlines, the Iraq disaster began.

Iraq would cost the lives of almost 4,500 Americans and 100,000-plus Iraqis, and $800 billion, bumed like oil fires in the desert.-\* The steady stream of grisly images out of the Middle East was only interrupted, in 2005, by the shocking spectacle of a major American city drowning while the nation watched, helpless.

As the decade of war dragged on, the housing bubble began to pop, ultimately bringing about the worst financial panic in eighty years. In the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it seemed possible that the U.S. financial system as a whole would cease to operate: a financial blackout that would render paychecks, credit cards, and ATMs useless.

In those frenzied days, I watched Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bemanke and Treasury secretary Hank Paulson defend their three-page proposal for a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in front of a packed and rowdy Senate hearing room. When pressed on the details by members of the Senate Banking Committee, Bemanke and Paulson were squirrelly. They couldn't seem to explain how and why they'd arrived at the number they had (one Treasury staffer would tell a reporter it was plucked more or less at random because they needed "a really big number").4

Watching them, I couldn't shake a feeling in the pit of my stomach that either these men had no idea what they were talking about or they were intentionally obfuscating because they did not want their true purpose known. These were the guys in charge, the ones tasked with rescuing the entire global financial system, and nothing about their vague and contradictory answers to simple questions projected competence or good faith.

Washington managed to pass the bailout for the financial sector, and while Wall Street would soon return to glory, wealth, and profitability, the rest of us would come to learn in gruesome detail all the ways in which the source of its prosperity had, in fact, been the largest Ponzi scheme in the history of human civilization.

The cumulative effect of these scandals and failures is an inescapable national mood of exhaustion, frustration, and betrayal. At the polls, we see it in the restless, serial discontent that defines the current political moment. The last three elections, beginning in 2006, have operated as sequential backlashes. In 2006 and 2008, Democrats were able to point to the horrifyingly inept response to Katrina, the bloody, costly quagmire in Iraq, and, finally, the teetering and collapsing economy. In 2010, Republicans could point to the worst unemployment rate in nearly thirty years—and long-term unemployment rates that rivaled those of the Great Depression—and present themselves as the solution.'

Surveying the results of the 2010 midterms on election night, Tom Brokaw alluded to the collapse of trust in institutions in the wake of a war based on lies and a financial bubble that went bust. "Almost nothing is going the way that most people have been told that it will. And every time they're told in Washington that they have it figured out, it turns out not to be true."6

At a press conference the day after Democrats faced a "shellacking" in the 2010 midterm elections, Barack Obama recounted the story of meeting a voter who asked him if there was hope of returning to a "healthy legislative process, so as I strap on the boots again tomorrow, I know that you guys got it under control? It's hard to have faith in that right now."

And who could blame him? From the American intelligence apparatus to financial regulators, government failures make up one of the most dispiriting throughlines of the crisis decade.

As citizens of the world's richest country\*, we expend little energy worrying about the millions of vital yet mundane functions our government undertakes. Roads are built, sewer systems maintained, mail delivered. We aren't preoccupied by the thought that skyscrapers will come crashing down because of unenforced building codes; we don't fret that our nuclear arsenal will fall into the wrong hands, or dread that the tax collector will hit us up for a bribe.

It is precisely because of our expectation of routine competence that government failure is so destabilizing.

"We've created this situation where we've created so much mistrust in government," Ivor van Heerden told me one night in a seafood restaurant in the coastal town of Houma, Louisiana.s For years van Heerden was deputy\* director of the LSU Hurricane Center, which issued a series of dire warnings about the insufficiencies of the levee system in the run-up to Katrina. After the storm, van Heerden was fired by LSU, because, he suspects, he was so outspoken in his criticism of the Army Corps of Engineers.

"You have these politicians that are selling this mistrust," he said in reference to the ceaseless rhetoric from conservatives about government's inevitable incompetence. "And the federal government sure as hell hasn't helped."

And yet the private sector has fared no better: from the popping of the tech bubble, to Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, to the Big Three automakers, to Lehman Brothers, subprime, credit default swaps, and Bemie Madoff, the overwhelming story of the private sector in the last decade has been perverse incentives, blinkered groupthink, deception, fraud, opacity\*, and disaster. So comprehensive and destructive are these failures that even those ideologically disposed to view big business in the best light have had to confront them. "I've always defended corporations," a Utah Tea Party\* organizer named Susan Southwick told me. " 'Of course they wouldn't do anything they knew was harming people; you guys are crazy.' But maybe I'm the crazy one who didn't see it."5

The dysfunction revealed by the crisis decade extends even past the government and the Fortune 500. The Catholic Church was exposed for its systematic policy of protecting serial child rapists and enabling them to victimize children. Perm State University\* was forced to fire its beloved football coach—and the university\* president—after it was revealed that much of the school's sports and administrative hierarchy had looked the other way while former assistant football coach Jerry\* Sandusky allegedly raped and abused young boys on its own property\*. Even baseball, the national pastime, came to be viewed as little more than a corrupt racket, as each week brought a new revelation of a star who was taking performance-enhancing drugs while owners, players, and union leadership colluded in a cover-up. "I'm 31, an Iraq war veteran, a Penn State graduate, a Catholic, a native of State College, acquaintance of Sandusky's, and a product of his Second Mile foundation," wrote Thomas Day, days after the Perm State scandal broke. "And I have fully lost faith in the leadership of my parents' generation."lc

The foundation of our shared life as Americans—where we worship, where we deposit our paychecks, the teams we root for, the people who do our business in Washington— seems to be cracking before our very eyes. In our idle panicked moments, we count down the seconds until it gives out.

In the course of writing this book, I spoke to hundreds of Americans from all over the country, from Detroit to New Orleans, Washington to Wall Street. I traveled to those places where institutional failure was most acute, and spoke with those lonely prophets who'd seen the failures coming, those affected most directly by their fallout, and those with their hands on the wheel when things went disastrously off course. No one I talked to has escaped the fail decade with their previous faith intact. Sandy Rosenthal, a New Orleans housewife radicalized by the failure of the levees during Katrina, founded Levees.org in order to hold the Army Corps of Engineers to account, and she described her own disillusionment in a way that's stuck with me: "We saw how quickly the whole thing can fall apart. We saw how quickly the whole thing can literally crumble.""

The sense of living on a razor's edge is, not surprisingly, most palpable in those areas of the country where economic loss is most acute. On a freezing cold January night in 2008,1 accompanied the John Edwards campaign bus on a manic, thirty-six-hour tour of New Hampshire, and in the wee hours of the morning on primary day we stopped in the small former mill town of Berlin, New Hampshire. Murray Rogers, the president of the local steelworkers union and himself a laid-off millworker, was one of those who came out to greet the campaign bus as it rolled into the Berlin fire station at 2 a.m. When I asked him why he was there, he told me it was because he felt like no one in government cared about the fate of the millworkers of New Hampshire ... with the exception of Edwards. When his mill had closed, he'd written to all the Democratic primary candidates. Edwards, he said, "offered to come and help us; he wrote a letter to the CEO because of the poor severance package they gave us. None of the others even offered to come."11 When news of Edwards's appalling personal behavior hit the papers, I immediately thought of Murray Rogers. Who would be Rogers's champion now?

In Detroit, the national capital of institutional collapse, the feeling of betrayal and alienation suffuses public life. "Just drive around," a local activist named Abayomi Azikiwe told me in 2010. "It's just block after block after block of abandoned homes, abandoned commercial structures."-: Officially unemployment was about 28 percent, he said, but the real figure was closer to 50 percent.14 "This is ground zero in terms of the economic crisis in this country. They say the stimulus package saved or created about two million jobs. We really don't see it." As hard hit as Detroit is, it's also probably the region of the country\* (with the exception of the tip of Lower Manhattan) that has most directly benefited from federal government intervention in the wake of the crash. In many ways the bailout of the automakers was a stunning success, but like so many of the Obama administration's successes, it is one only understood counterfactually: things could be much worse. But if this is what success looks like, what hope do the rest of us have?

"I can't remember when I last heard someone genuinely optimistic about the future of this country," former poet laureate Charles Simic wrote in the spring of 2011. "I know that when I get together with friends, we make a conscious effort to change the subject" from the state of the country\* "and talk about grandchildren, reminisce about the past and the movies we've seen, though we can't manage it for very long. We end up disheartening and demoralizing each other and saying goodnight, embarrassed and annoyed with ourselves, as if being upset about what is being done to us is not a subject fit for polite society\*. "lr

That emotional disquiet plays in different registers on the right and the left, but across the ideological divide you find a deep sense of alienation, anger, and betrayal directed at the elites who run the country\*. "I'm an agent for angst," one Tea Party\* organizer told me, "and the whole Tea Party\* movement is an agent for angst. "!t The progressive blogger Heather Parton, who goes by the screen name Digby, has dubbed the denizens of the Beltway who arrogate to themselves the role of telling Americans what to think the "Village," and it was Village mentality\*, a toxic combination of petty\* obsessions with status and access to power, that in her view produced the disaster in Iraq and the financial crisis that followed. In Parton's telling, the Village is "a permanent D.C. ruling class who has managed to convince themselves that they are simple, puritanical, bourgeois burghers and farmers, even though they are actually celebrity\* millionaires influencing the most powerful government on earth."17

It's not just the activist base of the left and the right who have recognized the widespread elite failure; more and more individual elites have broken ranks to acknowledge their own responsibility. Rob Johnson is a good example of this new kind of class traitor. With a re'sume that boasts a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton and years at the infamous Soros Quantum fund, Johnson has a uniquely intimate perspective on American elite failure: "For years, the right has worshipped markets and now they have reason to be skeptical," he told me. "Meanwhile, the left has romanticized government and now they have reason to be skeptical. So what you've got now is a society\* that is demoralized because they have nothing to believe in."ls

"Go all the way back to Sumerian civilization," Bill Clinton instructed a crowd of global jet-setters at the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos, "and you'll see that every successful civilization builds institutions that work, that lift people up and reward people for their greatness. Then, if you look at every one of those civilizations, all those institutions that benefited people get long in the tooth. They get creaky. The people ruling them become more interested in holding on to power than the purpose they were designed for. That's where we are now in the public and private sector."19

The Davos crowd seemed unmoved by this rare dose of honesty. But then, the mood of Davos that year was a strange mix of cluelessness, self-importance, and repressed shame. Hours after Clinton gave that speech, a European economist who had spent the last three decades consulting with a major American investment bank admitted to me that he, too, had lost faith in his own profession, and in the competence of the global ruling elite gulping down cocktails at the bar on all sides of us. "In retrospect we were all illiterate! I include myself in that. Larry Summers and Bob Rubin thought they were intellectual masters of the universe. Alan Greenspan, too. But the emperor had no clothes!"-0

In the early 1970s, Vietnam and Watergate provoked such national paroxysms of self-doubt and distrust that both Gallup and the General Social Survey began asking Americans how much trust they had in their major institutions—big business, public schools, the Supreme Court, and about a dozen others.

Writing in the New York Tones on April 8, 1970, James Reston observed: "Behind all the questions of politics, ideologies and personalities ... lies the larger issue of public confidence and trust in the institutions of the nation.... That trust does not exist now. The authority\* of the Government, of the church, of the university, and even of the family is under challenge all over the Republic, and men of all ages, stations and persuasions agree that this crisis of confidence is one of the most important and dangerous problems of the age.""'

But what was viewed at the time as a nadir of public trust turns out to have been its high-water mark. By 2007—even before the financial crash—both Gallup and the General Social Survey showed public trust in nearly every single major institution at or near an all-time low." Twelve of sixteen institutions measured by Gallup recorded their all-time low in public confidence in the aughts, while seven were at their all-time high in the seventies. Those institutions that have lost the most trust are also the most central to the nation's functioning: banks, major companies, the press, and, perhaps most troublingly, Congress.

According to Gallup, Congress is the least trusted institution in the country: just 12 percent of respondents expressed a "great deal" of trust in it. Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig, who studies campaign finance and congressional corruption, notes that the British Crown was almost certainly more widely trusted in the colonies at the time of the revolution.23 Approval ratings of Congress lag behind Paris Hilton and the United States going communist.

A 2010 Pew survey revealed that trust in government in general was at the lowest level since Pew started measuring it in 1978. But "while anti-government sentiment has its own ideological and partisan basis," Pew noted, "the public also expresses discontent with many of the country's other major institutions." The ratings for Congress were just as low as they were for "large corporations (25% positive) and banks and other financial institutions (22%)." And the marks were "only slightly more positive for the national news media (31%), labor unions (32%), and the entertainment industry (33%).":4

The least trusting are those who came of age in the aughts. A 2010 study conducted by the Harvard Institute of Politics asked more than three thousand millennials whether they thought various institutions did the right thing all the time, most of the time, some of the time, or never. Of the military, the Supreme Court, the President, the United Nations, the federal government, Congress, traditional media, cable news, and Wall Street executives, only one—the U.S. military—was believed to do the right thing all or most of the time by a majority\* of respondents.:?

You can construct a whole host of theories to explain this evaporation of trust. One of the most common, particularly popular with those who find themselves the target of distrust and anger, is that the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the frenetic intensity\* of the Internet eat away at people's faith by sensationalizing mistakes and insinuating nefarious motives.

Former Republican senator Bob Bennett, who was ousted by the Tea Party\* over his support of TARP, made precisely this case to me in explaining his own plight: "The moral for that story\* is: if people will read responsible publications and commentators ... and they have a sense of respect for institutions and those of us who labor in those institutions, then we're OK. But if you get all of your information from the blogs, then you're just angry\* because we're lying to you."2\*

There is no question that we have access to more information than ever before. The deluge of twenty-four-hour cable news and the Internet can obscure as much as it clarifies, and the explosion of prying electronic eyes in camera phones and Internet gossip sites means that every\* failing, every\* misstep, no matter how small or human or pathetic, can be and often is reported and obsessed over. In another era, we probably would never have seen Anthony Weiner's crotch shot, and—let's be honest—the republic isn't any better off for us having had that privilege.

A natural consequence of the proliferation of news sources is a more balkanized political landscape. CBS's Walter Cronkite would speak to nearly 20 million people every\* night during his heyday, an audience larger than all three network evening newscasts combined in 2010. As the audience has dispersed, distrust in the media has skyrocketed. In 1979, newspapers were one of the most trusted institutions in America, with ratings over 50 percent; today they're one of the least. The same goes for TV news.2

Declining trust in the mainstream media isn't helped by the simple fact that it hasn't performed particularly well during the past ten years. By and large the media managed to miss the two most consequential stories of the decade—the manipulation of intelligence that led to the Iraq War, and the growth of the housing bubble and associated financial chicanery\* that would ultimately cause the crash.

But after surveying the wreckage of the fail decade, it takes some willful delusion to blame the media or an ungrateful public for our predicament. We do not trust our institutions because they have shown themselves to be untrustworthy. The drumbeat of institutional failure echoes among the populace as skepticism. And given both the scope and the depth of this distrust, it's clear that we're in the midst of something far grander and more perilous than just a crisis of government or a crisis of capitalism. We are in the midst of a broad and devastating crisis of authority\*.

When you bring your car to your mechanic because it's making a worrisome noise, you trust that he's knowledgeable enough to figure out what's wrong and scrupulous enough not to rip you off. On all things auto-related, your mechanic is an authority. In public life, our pillar institutions and the elites who run them play the mechanic's role. They are charged with the task of diagnosing and fixing problems in governance, the market, and society\*. And what we want from authorities, whether they are mechanics, money managers, or senators, is that they be competent—smart, informed, able—and that they not use their authority\* to pursue a hidden agenda or personal gain.

We now operate in a world in which we can assume neither competence nor good faith from the authorities, and the consequences of this simple, devastating realization is the defining feature of American life at the end of this low, dishonest decade. Elite failure and the distrust it has spawned is the most powerful and least understood aspect of current politics and society\*. It structures and constrains the very\* process by which we gather facts, form opinions, and execute self-governance. It connects the Iraq War and the financial crisis, the Tea Party\* and MoveOn, the despair of laid-off autoworkers in Detroit to the foreclosed homeowners in Las Vegas and the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans: nothing seems to work. All the smart people fucked up, and no one seems willing to take responsibility\*.

#### Vote negative to politicize the ballot AGAINST their useless style of simulated politics---we refuse to consent to a methodology that consolidates power in the hands of corporate oligarchy---Shattering the illusion of FIAT and forcing the aff to search for new Models of Debate---they don’t get a perm because we are asking a PRIOR QUESTION

Swyngedouw 8 (Erik, Prof of Social and Political Geography in School of Environment and Developpment at U of Manchester, Where is the political?)

The aim of this contribution is to re-centre political thought again by exploring the views of a series of political philosophers and interlocutors who share the view that ‘the political’ needs urgent attention, particularly in an environment that is sutured by a view of the ‘end of politics’ and the consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition. In the first part of the paper, I shall briefly consider the reduction, accelerating rapidly over the past few decades, of the political terrain to a post-democratic arrangement of oligarchic policing. The latter refers to the domination, to the attempted suturing of social space, by an instituted police order in which expert administration (a science/technology-management-policy assemblage), the naturalisation of the political to the management of a presumably inevitable ordering, and the desire for ‘good governance’ by an administrative elite in tandem with an economic oligarchy has occupied and increasingly tries to fill out, to suture, the spatiality of the political. In other words, the space of the political is increasingly colonised and saturated by the spaces of policies. In a second part, I shall attempt to re-centre the political by drawing on the work of a range of political theorists and philosophers who have begun to question this post- political order. Despite significant differences among them, they share a series of common understandings about what constitutes the domain of the political. The theme of the final section will be to consider the contours for reclaiming political democracy. I shall argue that democracy and democratic politics, and the spaces for democratic engagement need to be taken back from the post-political oligarchic constituent police order that has occupied and filled out the spaces of instituted democracy. It is in these political spaces that utopias as concrete political interventions germinate. The sort of utopia that Žižek argues is urgently needed today: “[t]he true utopia is when the situation is so without issue, without a way to resolve it within the coordinates of the possible that out of the pure urge of survival you have to invent a new space. Utopia is not kind of a free imagination; utopia is a matter of innermost urgency. You are forced to imagine it as the only way out, and this is what we need today” (Žižek 2005).

The Post-Political and Post-Democratic Condition “There is a shift form the model of the polis founded on a centre, that is, a public centre or agora, to a new metropolitan spatialisation that is certainly invested in a process of de-politicisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to decide what is private and what is public” (Agamben 2006). Pierre Rosanvallon, in his search for a renewed political democracy, laments the recent obsession with (good) ‘governance’ as the new name of a government that would be sufficient for everyone, that would encompass, suture, the social order. For him, this replaces “politics by widely disseminated techniques of management, leaving room for one sole actor on the scene: international society, uniting under the same banner the champions of the market and the prophets of law” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). These arrangements of ‘good’ governance relate to those who embrace “the development of a new type of civil society that would finally substitute for the world of politics. On this front one finds the naïve representatives of NGOs – leftists who have re-invented themselves as humanitarians – and the executives of multinational corporations, all of whom commune together today in a touching defense of an international civil society. The utopias of the one, alas, are hardly different from the hypocrisies of the others” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). Slavoj Žižek defines such ‘governance’ as post-political arrangements that focus on the administration (policing) of environmental, social, economic or other domains: “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, he argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (Žižek 2002a: 303). This post-political frame reduces politics to the sphere of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions, one that excludes those who are deemed ‘irresponsible’ (see (Raco 2003);(Baeten 2008);(Swyngedouw 2008a)). It is policy- making set within a given distribution of what is possible and driven by a desire for consent within a context of recognized difference. The stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and disruption or dissent is reduced to the instituted and institutional modalities of governing, the technologies of expert administration and management, to the dispositifs (see (Agamben 2007)) of ‘good governance’: “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account.” (Žižek 1999b: 198) “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Zizek, 2006: 72).

This post-political condition takes the scandalous proposition of Marx that the state is the executive branch of the capitalist class as literally true: identifying politics with the management of capitalism is no longer a hidden secret behind the appearance of formal democracy; it has become the openly declared basis for democratic legitimacy. Maximizing the enjoyment of the people can only be achieved by declaring the inability or incapacity of the people (as a political name) to arrange or manage themselves the conditions of this maximization. The power of post-political democracy resides, in other words, in the declaration of its impotence to act politically (Rancière 1998: 113). Moreover, any denunciation or any struggle against this tactic of depoliticisation is regarded as going against historical necessity. Once again drawing on a populist and perverted Marxism, those protesting are deemed to go against the grain of history and belong to an outdated social group embracing transcended ideologies. The irony is indeed how depoliticisation is effectuated by a certain return to Marx (Rancière 2005b: 95). The post-political in its instituted democratic form, of course, elevates the ‘scandal of democracy’ to new heights. This ‘scandal’ refers to the democratic promise of the identity of the state with the people, a promise that must, of necessity, annul the constitutive antagonisms that cut through ‘the people’. While the place of power in democracy is structurally vacant (as it is liberated from the god-given location on which pre-modern state power was legitimized – (see (Lefort 1994)), yet is metaphorically filled with ‘the people’ as sovereign, those who occupy the place of power and democracy must suture the social order, contain the inherent antagonisms of the social order by suturing social space; the totality of the social is presented in the body of the state. This impossibility, the rupture of the democratic condition from within, is exactly where Claude Lefort (but see also Hannah Arendt from a slightly different perspective (Ahrendt 1973)) locates the totalitarian kernel of democratic forms (Lefort 1986). Democracy’s dark underbelly resides exactly in how its identification with the people can drive towards a position where the occupation of the place of power identifies with the whole of the people, disavows the constitutive conflicts within the social order and the gap between the place of political and the social ordering of the people. Post-politics is caught in this tension: the disappearance of the political as the space for the enunciation of dissensus (see below) and the suturing of social space by the post-political order harbours authoritarian gestures (see (Swyngedouw 2000), exactly by foreclosing the possibility for the political to emerge.

In sum, post-politics is of necessity a violation of democracy. It requires foreclosing or displacing dissent and manufacturing consent and, therefore, annuls the proper democratic political. Indeed, the tension between the Multiple of the Political and the Singular or the One of Policy (Swyngedouw 2008b) is overlaid by the ‘scandal of democracy’, its impossible core that promises pluralist dissensual arrangements, yet institutes exclusive, singular, consensual practices. Indeed, post-politics refuses politicisation which aims at “more” than the negotiation of interests. A consensual post- politics arises that either eliminates fundamental conflict (usually by invoking the whole of the people – (see (Swyngedouw 2007a) and/or elevates it to Schmittian antithetical ultra-politics (Schmitt 1996). The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement.

Propelled on by a drive towards reflexivity, the need to make decisions on processes with high risk low probability (Beck’s risk society thesis) on the one hand and the injunction to choose in the absence of any grounding or guarantee in truth, transfers administrative powers increasingly to a technocratic-scientific elite who is supposed to know and (cap)able to manage the situation. While difficulties and problems are staged and generally accepted as problematic (such as, for example, climate change, social exclusion, economic competitiveness, and the like), they need to be dealt with through compromise, managerial and technical arrangement, and the production of consensus. Consensus, in a very precise sense, is for Rancière the key condition of post-politics: “Consensus refers to that which is censored … Consensus means that whatever your personal commitments, interests and values may be, you perceive the same things, you give them the same name. But there is no contest on what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus means that the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given situation. Correspondingly, dissensus and disagreement don’t only mean conflict of interests, ideas and so on. They mean that there is a debate on the sensible givens of a situation, a debate on that which you see and feel, on how it can be told and discussed, who is able to name it and argue about it … It is about the visibilities of the places and abilities of the body in those places, about the partition of private and public spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it … Consensus is the dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world” (Rancière 2003b: §4- 6).

Consensus, as the “the annulment of dissensus” announces the “end of politics” (Rancière 2001: §32). This post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus). However, consensus does not equal peace or absence of fundamental conflict (Rancière 2005a: 8). Indeed, in the absence of real politicization, the only position of real dissent is that of either the traditionalist or the fundamentalist. The only way to deal with them is by sheer violence, by suspending their ‘humanitarian’ and ‘democratic’ rights. The post-political relies on either including all in a consensual pluralist order and on excluding radically those who posit themselves outside the consensus. For the latter, as Agamben (Agamben 2005) argues, the law is suspended; they are literally put outside the law and treated as extremists and terrorists: those who are not with us are irremediably against us, they constitute the enemy. Invoking the Whole/the One of the people, while denying the constitutive antagonisms and splits within the people and that cut through the social order, post-political governance is necessarily exclusive, partial, and predicated upon outlawing those that do not subscribe to the consensual arrangement. That is exactly why for Agamben ‘the Camp’ has become the core figure to identify the condition of our time. In other words, a Schmittian ultra- politics that lurks behind and underneath the post-political consensual order and does not tolerate an outside, that sutures the entire social space by the tyranny of the police (state) and squeezes out the political, pits those who ‘participate’ in the instituted configurations of the consensual post-political order radically against those who are placed outside, like the sans-papiers, political islam, radical environmentalists, communists and alter- globalists, or the otherwise marginalized. The riots in the suburbs of France’s big cities in the fall of 2005 and the police responses to this event were classic violent examples of such urban ultra-politics (see Dikec, 2007). This post-political consensus, therefore, is radically reactionary as it forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental and socio-spatial possibilities and assemblages. There is no contestation over the givens of the situation, over the partition of the sensible, there is only debate over the technologies of management, the arrangements of policing, the configuration of those who already have a stake, whose voice is already recognized as legitimate. Consider, for example, how current climate change policy aims to retro-fit the climate with technological-managerial interventions in order to continue as before, in order to make sure nothing changes fundamentally (see (Swyngedouw 2007a), so that things go on as before! (Dean 2006).

Rancière, Mouffe and Crouch associate the political ‘form’ of this post-political consensus with the emergence of post-democatic institutional configurations: “Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimation of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests … Consensus demoracy is a reasonable agreement between individuals and social groups who have understood that knowing what is possible and negotiating between partners are a way for each party to obtain the optimal share that the objective givens of the situation allow them to hope for and which is preferable to conflict. But for parties to opt for discussion rather than a fight, they must exist as parties who then have to choose between two ways of obrtaining their share …. What consensus thus presupposes is the disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society …. It is, in a word, the disappearance of politics” (Rancière 1998: 102) (see also (Mouffe 2005: 29).

This arrangement assumes that “all parties are known and a world in which everything is on show, in which parties are counted with none left over and in which everything can be solved by objectifying problems” (Rancière 1998: 102). There is no excess left over and above that what is instituted. There is indeed a close relationship between the post- political condition and the functioning of the political system. Colin Crouch, Chantalle Mouffe and others insist that this kind of consensual post-politics is paralleled by the rise of a post-democratic institutional configuration ((Crouch 2000, 2004). For Colin Crouch, there is a significant decline of government by the people and for the people. Although the formal configuration of democracy is still intact, there is a proliferating arsenal of new processes that bypass, evacuate or articulate with these formal institutions. I have elsewhere defined constituted post-democracy as embodying new forms of autocratic Governance-Beyond-the-State (Swyngedouw 2005) in which the act of governing is reconfigured on the basis of a stakeholder arrangement of governance in which the traditional state forms (national, regional, or local government) partakes together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (see Crouch, 2004) in partitioning the sensible, in organizing the ‘distribution of places and functions’. This is the condition of post-1991 democracy. Not only is the political arena evacuated from radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict, but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through disembedded networks of governance. These new glocal forms of ‘governance’, operative at a range of articulated spatial scales, are expressive of the post-political configuration (Mouffe 2005: 103) (Swyngedouw 2007b) (Swyngedouw 2008a).

These arrangements of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ are resolutely put forward as an idealized normative model (see (Le Galès 2002) (Schmitter 2002) that promise to fulfill the conditions of good government “in which the boundary between organisations and public and private sectors has become permeable” (Stoker 1998: 38). They are constituted as presumably horizontally networked associations, and based on interactive relations between independent and interdependent actors that share a high degree of consensus and trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within selectively inclusive participatory institutional or organisational settings. They imply a common purpose, joint action, a framework of shared values, continuous interaction and the wish to achieve collective benefits that cannot be gained by acting independently (Stoker 1998) (Rakodi 2003). It is predicated upon a consensual agreement on the existing conditions (the state of the situation) and the main objectives to be achieved. They exhibit an institutional configuration based on the inclusion of private market actors, civil society groups, and parts of the ‘traditional’ state apparatus (Lemke 2002) in which a particular rationality of governing is combined with new technologies, instruments, and tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, implementation, and often including policing as well.. The mobilised technologies of governance revolve around individualisation, reflexive risk-calculation (self-assessment), accountancy rules and accountancy based disciplining, quantification and bench-marking of performance. As Lemke (2002: 50) argues, such arrangements announce “a transformation of politics that restructures the power relations in society. What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs), that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a renewed relation between state and civil society actors”.

Politics is hereby reduced to the sphere of policy-making, to the domain of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly (and often imposed) participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions. Consensual policy-making in which the stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and where disruption or dissent is reduced to debates over the institutional modalities of governing and the technologies of expert administration or management, announces the end of politics, annuls dissent from the consultative spaces of policy making and evacuates the proper political from the public sphere. In this post-democratic post-political constitution, adversarial politics (of the left/right variety or of radically divergent struggles over imagining and naming different socio-environmental futures for example) are considered hopelessly out of date. Although disagreement and debate are of course still possible, they operate within an overall model of elite consensus and agreement (Crouch 2004), subordinated to a managerial-technocratic regime (see also (Jörke 2005) (Blühdorn 2006)), sustained by a series of populist tactics. What is at stake then, is the practice of genuine democracy, of a return to the polis, the public space for the encounter and negotiation of disagreement, where those who have no place, are not counted or named, can acquire, or better still, appropriate voice, become part of the police. But before we can consider this, we need to return to the possibilities of ‘thinking the political’.

Thinking the political I situate my argument of what constitutes the political in the interstices between two great, but radically opposed, perspectives that have galvanised much of progressive and leftist energies over the past few years. The first one is Hardt and Negri’s Empire and the immanent force of the multitude whose energies are liberated through the vicissitudes of empire, which in its womb, already harbours and nurtures the free reign of the multitude that will transgress and revolutionise the very disempowering and unequally constituted constellation of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001). Indeed, as they could claim at the end of their book, there is an unbearable lightness in being communist as the immanent force of the multitude will realise itself through some sort of mythical energetic force. The multitude as political agent, from their perspective, grows out of and supplants Empire as a necessary, teleological, revolutionary gesture; political subjectivity is barred, annulled; the forces of empire will just do the trick. In this sense, the observation that Hardt and Negri have written the Communist Manifesto for the 21st Century is correct; it breathes the same unrelenting belief in the immanence of the multitude as it will emerge from the debris of a transcended imperial order, and a politics of egalibertarian emancipation is already structurally fermenting within the interstices of rhizomatic and decentred imperial reign. Second, and at the other side of the spectre stands, symbolically speaking, John Holloway’s Change the world without taking power (Holloway 2002). For him, radical transformation resides in continuous political activism, the obsessive desire for becoming that supplants the need for being, for spatialisation. His emancipatory politics adheres to the sort of activism that asks the constituent oligarchic polity of state and of economy to change, to take the demands seriously. It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their transformation, let alone their replacement in a different constituent order. While the political is an immanent process borne out of the configurations of empire for Negri, it is the obsessive activist, driven by a desire for justice and an analytical toolkit that situates injustices within the contours of the politico-economic and socio-cultural order that holds the promise for radical change for Holloway. Simon Critchley offers an ethico-philosophical foundation for such anarchic ‘politics of resistance’ (Critchley 2007). For Slavoj Žižek, such politics of resistance has de facto accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism, centred on a critique of what is and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities. In a review of this position, Zizek (Žižek 2007) states: “The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’”

In what follows, I shall propose and explore a different foundation of and for the political, one that foregrounds the notion of equality as the foundation for democracy, for égaliberté as an unconditional democratic demand, one that sees the properly political as a procedure that disrupts any given socio-spatial order, one that addresses a ‘wrong’. This ‘wrong’ is a condition in which the axiomatic principle of equality is perverted through the institution of an order that is always necessarily oligarchic. The proper political, therefore, always operates at a certain distance from the state, but is aimed at the transformation of the state (the police). Let me start with considering Jacques Rancière’s conceptualization of politics and the political. For him, the space of the political has become sutured by what he defines as the police (or policy) (Rancière 1998);(Rancière 1995). He explores whether the political can still be thought in an environment in which a post-political consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policy-making’, to managerial consensual governing. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (la police), ‘the political’ (le politique), and ‘politics’ (la politique) (see also (Ricoeur 1965); (Lefort 2000)). The ‘police’ is defined as the existing order of things and constitutes a certain ‘partition of the sensible’ (Rancière 2001: 8): the police refers to “all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière 1994: 173). This partition of the sensible “renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised … This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space … It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience” (Rancière 2000a: 13-14). The police refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations and “… sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (Rancière 1998: 29). Indeed, as Dikec maintains, the police “relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution – distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on – and the normalization of this distribution” (Dikeç 2007: chapter 2, p. 5). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, that configures a set of activities and occupations and arranges the characteristics of the spaces where these activities are organized or distributed (Rancière 1998: 29). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: “[t]he essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by ‘the police’, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces” (Rancière 2000c: 124). This drive to suturing is of course never realized. The constitutive antagonisms that rupture society preempt saturation; there will always be a constituted lack or surplus, that what is not accounted for in the symbolic order of the police (Dikeç 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess (the ‘void’ for (Badiou 2006)) that constitutes the possibility of the political.

The political, then, is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding “the part for those who have no-part” (Rancière 2001: 6). The political is the arena in which Ochlos is turned into Demos, where the anarchic noise of the rabble (the part that has no-part) is turned into the recognized voice of the people, the spaces where that what is only registered as noise by the police is turned into voice. In the Nights of Labor, Rancière explores how the workers in 19th century France, through carving out there times and spaces, became the political subject under the name of the proletarian and, through this, claimed their place in the police order (Rancière 1989). Politics is, therefore, always disruptive, it emerges with the “refusal to observe the ‘place’ allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)” (Robson 2005: 5): it is the terrain where the axiomatic principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’; a ‘wrong’ that is always inherent in the oligarchic spaces of an instituted democratic polity. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; the foundational gesture of democracy is equality. It opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality, a subversion that inheres in the constituted ‘forms’ of democracy and, in an intensified way, in its post- political guise. Rancière is here on the same terrain as Alain Badiou: “[E]quality is not something to be researched or verified but a principle to be upheld” (Hallward 2003a: 228). Emancipatory politics emerge out of a fidelity to the democratic principle of equality; it is the unconditional given of and for democracy. Equality is, consequently, not some sort of utopian longing, but the very condition upon which the democratic political is founded. The truth (in the sense of being true or faithful to something) of democracy is its universalising foundation on equality and the demand for justice, for a just politics. Etienne Balibar (Balibar 1993) names this fusion of equality and liberty ‘égaliberté’, the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç 2001). The very promise of democracy, but which is always scandalously perverted, and therefore necessitates its continuing reclamation, is founded on the universalising and collective process of emancipation as égaliberté. Indeed, freedom and equality can only be conquered: they are never offered, granted or distributed.

The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify inequalities or unfreedoms, exemplified by the demands of many activists and others who are choreographing resistance to the police order, but, in contrast, it is the demand to be counted, named, and recognized as part of the police order. It is the articulation of voice that demands its place in the spaces of the police order: it appears, for example, when undocumented workers shout “we are here, therefore we are from here” and demand their place within the socio-political edifice. These are the evental time-spaces from where a proper political sequence may unfold. The political is about the unconditional enunciation of the right to égaliberté, the right to the polis; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in an oligarchic police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. This is of course what Rancière also refers as the scandal of democracy that maintains a singular presence, yet is radically split into two processes: the oligarchic police process on the one hand and the principle of equality expressed through the process of emanciptation on the other (Rancière 1998). Democratic politics, therefore, are radically anti-utopian; they are not about fighting for a utopian future, but are precisely about bringing into being, spatialising, what is already promised by the very principle upon which the democratic political is constituted, i.e. equality.

If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, “a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority”. (Hallward 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of “floating subjects that deregulate all respresentations of places and portions.”(Rancière 1998: 99-100): “In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it.” (Rancière 2003a: 201)

The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the policy order claim their right to speak, acquire speech, and produce the spatiality that permits and sustains this right. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms, voids and excesses that constitute the police order, and tests the principle of equality. The political, therefore, always operates from a certain minimal distance from the State/the police1. Politics proper, then, is the confrontation of the political with the police order, when the principle of equality confronts a wrong instituted through the police order. It appears thus when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, “when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (Rancière 1998: 11): “[p]olitics in general … is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible” (Rancière 2003b: 3). A proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustices or inequalities, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Therefore, a proper politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative:

“Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (Rancière 1998: 33) and “… revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière 2006b: 13).

The space of the political is to “disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole” (Rancière 2001), it is a particular that stands for the whole of the community and aspires towards universalisation. The space of the political is therefore always specific, concrete, particular, but stands as the metaphorical condensation of the universal. And of course, politics is about the production of spaces and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: “[t]he principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in on” (Rancière 2001: Thesis 8); it occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no foundational place or location: “Politics ‘takes place’ in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on”, it is the disruption of the police order (Rancière 2003c: 7). It can arise anywhere and everywhere. “[S]pace becomes political in that it … becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests” (Dikeç 2005: 172). The political understood in above terms rejects a naturalization of the political, signals that a political ‘passage à l’acte’ does not rely on expert knowledge and administration (the partition of the sensible), but on a disruption of the field of vision and of the distribution of functions and spaces on the basis of the principle of equality. With Alain Badiou, Rancière shares the view that the political event is rare and unusual; they are far from believing that ‘everything is political’, the clarion call of 1970s style progressive movements. While the political event might arise anywhere and everywhere, the political sequence is unusual, eventual, not predictable, and, above all, disruptive. Politics, i.e. the struggle of those who have no name and no voice to enter the space of the police, the contested borderline zone between the political and the police, is an even rarer moment, when those who are part of the situation but not part of the state of the situation become part of the state.

This view of the political as a space of dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict, stands in sharp contrast to the consolidating consensual ‘post- politics’ of contemporary neo-liberal ‘good’ governance. Of course, it also begs the question as to what to do. How to reclaim the political, as discussed above, from the debris of consensual autocratic post-political post-democracy? Claiming the Democratic Polis

The notion of the political articulated in this paper centers on division, conflict, and polemic (Valentine 2005), accepts the constitutive antagonisms that split ‘the people’, that traverse the myth of the One, the singular, and rejects the myth of an archae-political possibility of an organic, sutured, unfractured community, the possibility of a community one with itself. Therefore, democracy always operates against pacification, acknowledges social disruption, and disturbs the management of consensus and ‘stability’. As Peter Hallward, echoing Rancière and Badiou, argues: “[t]he concern of democracy is not with the formulation of agreement or the preservation of order but with the invention of new and hitherto unauthorised modes of disaggregation, disagreement and disorder” (Hallward 2005: 34-35). A political truth procedure, for Badiou, is initiated when in the name of equality fidelity to an event is declared, a fidelity that, although always particular, aspires to become public, to universalize. It is a wager on the truth of the egalitarian political sequence, unleashed by a declaration of fidelity to the communist hypothesis (Badiou 2008), a truth that can be only verified ex-post. Preferred examples of Badiou and Žižek are Robespierre, Lenin, or Mao in their declaration of fidelity to the procedure of communist truth in the revolutionary event.

Badiou defines ‘le passage à l’acte’ as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition and marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. Žižek insists that such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Žižek 1999b). Proper politics is thus about enunciating demands that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate a transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the actual political process through which those that have no part claim their place within the symbolic edifice of the police, become part of the state of the situation. This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, that require a transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible. It is the sort of demands that ‘restructure the entire social space’ (Žižek 1999b: 208), that are impossible to be symbolized within the existing police order. The form of politicization predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands cuts directly against the radical politics that characterize so much of the current forms and theorizations of resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming, this approach starts from the suturing attempts of the existing police order and its associated social relations; rather than reveling in the immanence of imperial transformation, an immanence to which there is no outside (à la Hardt and Negri), rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances, alternative practices, and affects (à la Holloway or Critchley), the view explored in this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ through a political truth procedure that necessitates taking sides (see (Dean 2006: 115). Politics understood as rituals of resistance is, according to Zizek, doomed to fail politically: “Radical political practices itself is conceived as an unending process which can destabilize, displace, and so on, the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it effectively – the ultimate goal of radical politics is ultimately to displace the limit of social exclusions, empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity” (Žižek 2002b: 101).

The problem with such tactics is not only that they leave the symbolic order intact and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, they are actually conducive to the flows of global capital and can be fully subsumed within it. As Žižek puts it, “these practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are already taken into account, even engendered by the hegemomic form” (Žižek 1999b: 264).

In contrast, as Alain Badiou (Badiou 2005b) argues, a new radical politics requires formulating and enrolling new great fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different egalibertarian socio-environmental or geographical futures. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures, making the new and impossible enter the realm of politics and of democracy on the basis of the very promise of democracy (egaliberty), but which the oligarchic hatred of democracy systematically undermines or disrupts, and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Politics consists in a “series of actions that reconfigure the space where parties, parts, or lack of any parts have been defined (Rancière 1998: 30)” cited in (Dikeç 2005: 181-182)”. Proper egalitarian democracy is “the symbolic institution of the political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled to exercise power – a rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination. It is the paradoxical power of those who do not count: the count of the ‘unaccounted for’” (Rancière 2000c: 124). Dissensus is the proper name of egalitarian politics:

“The notion of dissensus thus means the following: politics is comprised of a surplus of subjects that introduce, within the saturated order of the police, a surplus of objects. These subjects do not have the consistency of coherent social groups united by a common property or a common birth, etc. They exist entirely within the act, and their actions are manifestations of a dissensus; that is, the making contentious of the givens of a particular situation. The subjects of politics make visible that which is not perceivable, that which, under the optics of a given perceptive field, did not possess a raison d’être, that which did not have a name …. This … constitutes the ground for political action: certain subjects that do not count create a common polemical scene where they put into contention the objective status of what is ‘given’ and impose an examination and discussion of those things that were not ‘visible’, that were not accounted for previously” (Rancière 2000c: 124-125)

Therefore, the political act (intervention) proper is “not simply something that works well within the framework of existing relations, but something that changes the very framework that determines how things work …. it changes the very parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ in the existing constellation (emphasis in original)” (Žižek 1999b: 199). The political becomes for Žižek and Rancière the space of litigation (Žižek 1998), the space for those who are not-All, who are uncounted and unnamed, not part of the ‘police’ (symbolic or state) order. A true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place.

This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, demands that presupposes or requires a transformation of socio-physical space. Such egalitarian-democratic demands, scandalous in the representation order of the police yet eminently realizable, are like those formulated in the last chapter of the Communist Manifesto (universal and free education, universal and free care for the elderly, universal and equitable voting rights, universal and free health care, collective organization of (produced) natures). When these demands were formulated in 1848, they were scandalous, deeply disruptive and rejected out of hand as impossible by the police order. Yet, four of these five demands were realized in one form or another in most of Western Europe during the 20th century: the passion for the real (Badiou 2007) embodied by these demands fuelled the passage to the act that instituted them. That constitutes, for Badiou or Ranciere, a proper political sequence, and one that can be thought and practiced irrespective of any substantive social theorization – it is the political in itself at work. Of course, the current neo-liberal police order has already substantially eroded these democratic gains while traversing the symbolic order, one that now sees these demands again as scandalous and impossible. These are today among the key arenas where the principle of freedom and equality is perverted and undermined, where the scandal of democracy erupts most violently.

Another example of such political sequence erupted when, in 1981, Solidarnosc’s demands for better working conditions on the Gdansk shipyards translated into the universal demands for political rights against the oligarchic bureaucratic order of state capitalism and their apparatchiks in Poland; when the latter acknowledged the demands of the activists, their police order’s symbolic edifice and constituted order crumbled and revealed the empty locus of power. They launched a proper political sequence that would overturn the symbolic order and the distribution of functions and places associated with it. Or when civil society groups took to the streets of East Germany and demanded different rights, it started a sequence that would transform existing authoritarian state forms. Their subsequent history of course also signaled their accelerated incorporation into a post-political European order as the opened dissensual political space soon closed down again.

It is the sort of demand expressed when illegal and other immigrants in Europe or the US claim that ‘we are here, therefore we are from here’. The illegal immigrant already foreshadows of course the idealized neoliberal subject, the one without political inscription, without papers (and therefore no rights); the illegal immigrant already stands in as the subject neoliberalisation seeks to universalize, the one without papers, homo sacer, and who, consequently, has no other choice than to sell him- or herself to the highest bidder: “Nowadays, when the welfare state is gone, this separation between citizens and non-citizens still remains, but with an additional paradox that non citizens represent the avant-garde within the neo-liberal project, because they are indeed positioned within the labor force market without any kind of social rights or state protection. Thus, if we examine this problem in such a way, the sanspapiers and the erased are the avant-garde form of sociality which would prevail if the neo- liberal concept is to be fully realized, if it would not be important anymore if someone is a citizen or not, if everybody would be defined only according to their position in the labor market and the labor process” (Pupovac and Karamani 2006: 48).

Such new symbolizations through which what is considered to be noise by the police is turned into speech, is where a proper politicization of the spatial should start from, where a possible re-politicization of public civic space resides. These symbolizations should start from the premise that the promise of democracy, political equality, is ‘wronged’ by the oligarchic police order, and where those who are unaccounted for, unnamed, whose fictions are only registered as noise, claim their metaphorical and material space. Reclaiming the democratic polis as the space of dissensus, disagreement, and as the space where places for enunciating the different, for staging the voices of those unheard or unnoticed are constructed, egalibertarian voices that aspire to universalisation, is exactly where a proper democratic politics should reside. And it is exactly these practices that urgently require attention, nurturing, recognition and valorization. They demand their own space; they require the creation of their own material and cultural landscapes, their own emblematic geographies. These are the spaces where the post-political post- democratic consensus is questioned, where the right to égaliberté is asserted, practices of radical democratization experimented with, and democracy conquered; not an instituted formal arrangement that cannot but subvert itself, but one that aims at overtaking and replacing instituted post-political post-democracy.

#### This is a question of priorities---their reliance on the state actively promotes racist domestic warfare and the prison industrial complex---prefer the alt which allows for more creative, dynamic forms of activism AGAINST THE STATE---the pedagogical nature of the activity matters

Rodriguez 8 (Dylan, Associate Professor at Un iversity of Califo r n i a Riverside, Warfare and the Terms of Engagement, libcom.org/files/Critical Resistance - Abolition Now! Ten Years of Strategy and Struggle against the Prison Industrial Complex.pdf

This introductory litany of dread reminds us that domestic warfare is both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan's "war on drugs" and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mount­ ing with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD Chief William Bratton on the strength of his own words, the pri­ mary work of the police is to engage aggressively in "the internal war on terrorism," which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces, to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against crimi- 92 nalized populations o f choice, and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to fa­ cilitate the state's various localized "wars on gangs." It is in this context that we can urgently assume the political burden of critically assessing the work of progressive US based community and non-profit organizations, grassroots movements, and is­ sue-based campaigns: that is, if we are to take the state's own language of domestic warfare seriously, what do we make of the political, ideological, institutional, and financial relationships that progressive movements, campaigns, and organizations are creating in (uneasy) alliance with the state's vast architectures of war? Under what conditions and sets of assumptions are progressive activists, organizers, and scholars able to so militantly oppose the proliferation of American state violence in other parts of the world, while tolerating the everyday state violence of US policing, criminal law, and low-intensity genocide?

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprec­ edented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto­ apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis-and political possibility-for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institution­ alize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, mili­ tarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant politi­ cal energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home."

This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the po­ litical and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spec­ trum of government-proctored non-profit organizations. It i s i n the context o f the formation o f the NPIC a s a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and dis­ turbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate-and accompanying unwillingness to abolish-the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crimi­ nalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building proj ect. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, so­ cial and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to en­ bdgt ill Jesperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars.

Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politi­ cally normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of domi­ nance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises o f this condition o f domestic warfare i n favor o f short-term, "winnable" policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tol­ erate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of en­ gagement (that is, warfare)? This radical accountability reflects a variation on anti­ colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses:

Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opac­ ity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness.

Lest we fall victim to a certain political nostalgia that is often induced by such illuminating Fanonist exhortations, we ought to clarify the premises of the social "mission" that our generation of US based progressive organizing has undertaken. In the vicinity of the constantly retrenching social welfare apparatuses of the US state, much of the most urgent and immediate work of community-based or­ ganizing has revolved around service provision. Importantly, this pragmatic focus also builds a certain progressive ethic of voluntarism that constructs the model ac­ tivist as a variation on older liberal notions of the "good citizen." Following Fanon, the question is whether and how this mission ought to be fulfilled or betrayed. I believe that to respond to this political problem requires an analysis and conceptu­ alization of "the state" that is far more complex and laborious than we usually allow in our ordinary rush of obligations to build campaigns, organize communities, and write grant proposals. In fact, I think one pragmatic step toward an abolitionist politics involves the development of grassroots pedagogies (such as reading groups, in-home workshops, inter-organization and inter-movement critical dialogues) that will compel us to teach ourselves about the different ways that the state works in the context of domestic warfare, so that we no longer treat it simplistically. We require, in other words, a scholarly activist framework to understand that the state can and must be radically confronted on multiple fronts by an abolition ist politics.

In so many ways, the US progressive/left establishment is filling the void created by what Ruthie Gilmore has called the violent "abandonments" of the state, which forfeits and implodes its own social welfare capacities (which were already insuf­ ficient at best) while transforming and (productively) exploding its domestic war­ making functionalities (guided by a " frightening willingness to engage in human sacrifice"). Yet, at the same time that the state has been openly galvanizing itself to declare and wage violent struggle against strategically targeted local populations, the establishment left remains relatively unwilling and therefore institutionally un­ able to address the questions of social survival, grassroots mobilization, radical so­ cial justice, and social transformation on the concrete and everyday terms of the very domestic wares) that the state has so openly and repeatedly declared as the premises of its own coherence.

P I T FA L L S O F T H E P E DAG O G I CA L STATE

We can broadly understand that "the state" is in many ways a conceptual term that refers to a mind-boggling array of geographic, political, and institutional relations of power and domination. It is, in that sense, a term of abstraction: certainly the state is "real," but it is so massive and institutionally stretched that it simply can­ not be understood and "seen" in its totality. The way we come to comprehend the state's realness-or differently put, the way the state makes itself comprehensible, intelligible, and materially identifiable to ordinary people-is through its own self­ narrations and institutional mobilizations.

Consider the narrative and institutional dimensions of the "war on drugs," for nample. New Y ork City mayor Edward Koch, in a gesture of masculine challenge to the Reagan-era Feds, offers a prime example of such a narration in a 1986 op-ed piece published on the widely-read pages of The New York Times: I propose the following steps as a coordinated Federal response to [the war on drugs]: Use the full resources of the military for drug interdiction. The Posse Comitatus doctrine, which restricts participation of the military in civilian law enforce­ ment, must be modified so that the military can be used for narcotics control . . . Enact a Federal death penalty for drug wholesalers. Life sentences, harsh fines, forfeitures of assets, billions spent on education and therapy all have failed to deter the drug wholesaler. The death penalty would. Capital punishment is an extraordinary remedy, but we are facing an extraordinary peril . . . Designate United States narcotics prisons. The Bureau of Prisons should des­ ignate separate facilities for drug offenders. Segregating such prisoners from others, preferably i n remote locations such a s the Yukon or desert areas, might motivate drug offenders to abandon their trade. Enhance the Federal agencies combating the drug problem. The Attorney Gen­ eral should greatly increase the number of drug enforcement agents in New York and other cities. He should direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to devote substantial manpower against the cocaine trade and should see to it that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is capable of detecting and deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes in far better numbers than it now does. Enact the state and local narcotics control assistance act of 1986. This bill provides $750 million annually for five years to assist state and local jurisdictions increase their capacities for enforcement, corrections, education and prosecution.

These proposals offer no certainty for success in the fight against drugs, of course. If we are to succeed, however, it is essential that we persuade the Federal Government to recognize its responsibility to lead the way. Edward Koch's manifesto reflects an important dimension of the broader in­ stitutional, cultural, and political activities that build the state as a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City Mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politi­ cally willing and accomplice corporate media.

This storytelling-which through repetition and saturation assembles the pop­ ular "common sense" of domestic warfare-is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, mili­ tarized struggle against its declared internal enemies. Consider, for example, how pronouncements like those of Koch, Reagan, and Bratton seem to always be ac­ companied by the operational innovation of different varieties of covert ops, urban guerilla war, and counterintelligence warfare that specifically emerge through the state's declared domestic wars on crime/drugs/gangs/etc. Hence, it is no coincidence that Mayor Koch's editorial makes the stunning appeal to withdraw ("modify") the Posse Comitatus principle, to allow the Federal government's formal mobilization of its global war apparatus for battle in the homeland neighborhoods of the war on drugs. To reference our example even more closely, we can begin to see how the ramped-up policing and massive imprisonment of Black and Latino youth in Koch's 1980s New York were enabled and normalized by his and others' attempts to story tell the legal empowerment and cultural valorization of the police, such that the nuts-and-bolts operation of the prison industrial complex was lubricated by the multiple moral parables of domestic warfare.

This process of producing the state as an active, tangible, and identifiable structure of power and dominance, through the work of self-narration and con­ crete mobilizations of institutional capacity, is what some scholars call "statecraft." Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to us through these definitive moments of crafting: that is, we come to identify the state as a series of active political and institutional projects. So, if the state's self-narration inundates us with depictions of its policing and juridical arms as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars-for my generation, the "war on drugs," the generation prior, the "war on crime," and the current generation, localized "wars on gangs" and their planetary rearticulation in the "war on terror"-then it is the ma­ terial processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponiza­ tion of the police, that commonly represents the existence of the state as we come to normally "know" it.

Given that domestic warfare composes both the common narrative language and concrete material production of the state, the question remains as to why the establishment left has not confronted this statecraft with the degree of absolute emergency that the condition implies (war!). Perhaps it is because we are under­ estimating the skill and reach of the state as a pedagogical (teaching) apparatus, replete with room for contradiction and relatively sanctioned spaces for " dissent" and counter-state organizing. Italian political prisoner Antonio Gramsci's thoughts on the formation of the contemporary pedagogical state are instructive here: The State does have and request consent, but it also "educates" this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class.

Although Gramsci was writing these words in the early 1900s, he had already iden­ tified the institutional symbiosis that would eventually produce the non-profit in­ dustrial complex. The historical record of the last three decades shows that liberal foundations such as the Ford, Mellon, Rockefeller, Soros and other financial entities have become politically central to "the private initiative of the ruling class" and have in fact funded a breath-taking number of organizations, grassroots campaigns, and progressive political interests. The questions I wish to insert here, however, are whether the financially enabling gestures of foundations also 1) exert a politically disciplinary or repressive force on contemporary social movements and community based organizations, while 2) nurturing an ideological and structural allegiance to the state that preempts a more creative, radical, abolitionist politics.

Several social movement scholars have argued that the "channeling mecha­ nisms" of the non-profit industrial complex "may now far outweigh the effect of direct social control by states in explaining the . . . orthodox tactics, and moderate goals of much collective action in modern America." The non-profit apparatus and its symbiotic relationship to the state amount to a sophisticated technology of po­ litical repression and social control, accompanying and facilitating the ideological and institutional mobilizations of a domestic war waging state. Avowedly pro­ gressive, radical, leftist, and even some misnamed "revolutionary" groups find it opportune to assimilate into this state-sanctioned organizational paradigm, as it simultaneously allows them to establish a relatively stable financial and operational infrastructure while avoiding the transience, messiness, and possible legal compli­ cation of working under decentralized, informal, or even "underground" auspices. Thus, the aforementioned authors suggest that the emergence of the state-proc­ tored non-profit industry "suggests a historical movement away from direct, crud­ er forms [of state repression], toward more subtle forms of state social control of social movements."

The regularity with which progressive organizations immediately forfeit the crucial political and conceptual possibilities of abolishing domestic warfare is a direct reflection of the extent to which domestic war has been fashioned into the everyday, "normal" reality of the state. By extension, the non-profit industrial complex, which is fundamentally guided by the logic of being state-sanctioned (and often state-funded), also reflects this common reality: the operative assumptions of domestic warfare are taken for granted because they form and inform the popu­ lar consensus.

Effectively contradicting, decentering, and transforming the popular consensus (for example, destabiliZing assertive assumptions common to progressive move­ ments and organizations such as "we have to control/get rid of gangs," "we need prisons," or "we want better police") is, in this context, dangerously difficult work. Although, the truth of the matter is that the establishment US left, in ways both spoken and presumed, may actually agree with the political, moral, and ideological premises of domestic warfare. Leaders as well as rank-and-file members in avowedly progressive organizations can and must reflect on how they might actually be supporting and reproducing existing forms of racism, white supremacy, state violence, and domestic warfare in the process of throwing their resources behind what they perceive as "winnable victories," in the lexicon of venerable community organizer Saul Alinsky. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One po­ litical move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider "insurgency" as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive ma­ neuvering of "resistance"). Reading a few a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon's call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: "For us who are de­ termined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood." While there are rare groups in existence that offer this kind of nourishing polit­ ical space (from the L.A.-based Youth Justice Coalition to the national organization INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence), they are often forced to expend far too much energy challenging both the parochialisms of the hegemonic non-profit apparatus and the sometimes narrow politics of the progressive US left.

I have become somewhat obsessed with amplifying the need for a dramatic, even spectacular political shift that pushes against and reaches beyond the implicit pro­ state politics of left progressivism. Most importantly, I am convinced that the aboli­ tion ot domestic warfare, not unlike precedent (and ongoing) struggles to abolish colonialism, slavery, and programmatic genocide, necessitates a rigorous theoreti­ cal and pragmatic approach to a counter- and anti-state radicalism that attempts to fracture the foundations of the existing US social form-because after all, there is truly nothing to be redeemed of a society produced through such terror-inspiring structures of dominance. lhis political shift requires a sustained labor of radical vision, and in the most crucial ways is actually anchored to "progressive" notions of life, freedom, community, and collective/personal security (including safety from racist policing/criminalization and the most localized brutalities of neoliberal or global capitalism).

Arguably, it is precisely the creative and pragmatic work of political fantasy/ political vision/political imagination that is the most underdeveloped dimension of the US establishment left's organizational modus operandi and public discourse. While a full discussion is best left for another essay, we might consider the post- 1960s history of the reactionary, neoconservative, and Christian fundamentalist US right, which has fully and eagerly engaged in these political labors of fantasy/vi-sionlimagination, and has seen the desires of their wildest dreams met o r exceeded in their struggles for political and cultural hegemony. It might be useful to begin by thinking of ourselves as existing in a relationship of deep historical obligation to the long and recent, faraway and nearby historical legacies of radical, revolutionary, and liberationist struggles that have made the abolition of oppressive violence their most immediate and fundamental political desire.

## 1nc

#### The aff commodifies the suffering of the victims of globalization in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation. Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon,¶ Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

## TVPA

#### Globalization is inevitable and entrenched worldwide

Sacchetti ‘13

(Clara Sacchetti, “Introduction: The Economy as Cultural System: Theory, Capitalism, Crisis” Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, Google Books)

Despite these recent public discussions, capitalism remains a marginal, somewhat subversive, term in the humdrum discourses about the economy. In one way, this is not too surprising given that its almost 300-year existence constitutes a very small part of a 200,000-year human history (Stanford 2008, 33). In another way, however, it is surprising given that capitalism has taken hold in so many parts of the world. Most people live in, or are influenced by, a capitalistic way of making a living, one characterized by the production of stuff for the express purpose of making profit; where input resources, the production process, and its attendant output are not collectively owned or shared but “belong” to particular entities who hold the status of legal “personhood”; where work is mostly defined by groups of people who do not own the means of production and thus have to “rent” out their physical and/or intellectual labors to those who do; and, perhaps most importantly, where the drive for profit overshadows any real consideration for human wellbeing and the environment. In the post-2008 era, citizens in the global North may be marginally more conscious of the negative consequences occasioned by the competitive drive for revenues, growth, and expansion (i.e. the profit motive), but very little seems to have changed. The (capitalistic) economy is regularly discussed and conceived of as natural, given, and unchangeable, underpinned by a pervasive belief in the effectiveness and efficiency of the profit motive.3 This is the case at a global level were input resources are extracted in one locale, shipped to multiple locales for partial processing, shipped again to another locale for assembly, and then shipped to consumers everywhere to capture ever more profit. Globalization is presumed to be the extension of the old logic, only grander, and therefore not something altogether new and transformative. Meanwhile, national, regional, and local concerns are eclipsed by an economy run by the dictates of an “invisible hand.” And just as the global transfer of commodities is rendered commonplace, goods once strictly regulated by import tariffs, quota restrictions, environmental laws, and safety regulations cross and re-cross nation-states under the sway of our collective commonsense. In short, the minimal friction that encumbers the astonishing processes of the global economy is matched by everyday thinking that is similarly free of friction: well oiled and uncomplicated.

#### Neolib key to individual liberty – turns case

Crouch 11

English sociologist and political scientist, former Professor of Governance and Public Management in the University of Warwick Business School until 2011 (Colin Crouch, “The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism” Winner of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung prize, Polity Press, August 8 2011)

First, neoliberalism has provided certain escapes from government domination and has extended choice to ordinary people who had been accustomed to taking what they were given. This has been particularly important, as we are living in a period when party and parliamentary politics in general have come to be seen negatively, as a game among seekers after political office rather than as a forum for representing popular concerns. Second, neoliberal approaches have tackled the problems of centralism and remoteness that are endemic in much government action in large, complex societies. Against this it needs to be recognized that neoliberalism has not always associated itself with local sensitivities. It does so in terms of local government in the USA, Where history and stereotypes pit a left-leaning central state against rightist local politicians. But in that country it has also been associated with the triumph of big business against smaller firms. In contrast, in the UK the authors of neoliberal policies, governments of all parties since 1979, have seen local government and other local forces as sources of non—market interference in their own marketization project. Neoliberals here have been centralizers. In this, they have been on strong if paradoxical historical ground. The original rise of the capitalist economy in Europe ran alongside the concentration of formerly feudal powers in the hands of centralizing monarchs. If polity and economy were to be separated - a primary rule of liberal and neoliberal ideologies alike - then political power had first to be collected together from where it was spread all over society and concentrated in one place, where, if the monarchy so desired, it could be used in a friendly way. The issue of central versus local cannot therefore be automatically read as the same as state versus market. Finally, we must return to the flexibility of the neoliberal paradigm. Particularly in the Nordic countries, but to some extent also in the UK and generally in EU policy, it has shown a capacity to combine with other ideologies and political approaches. It is important that ruling ideas show a capacity to do this, not just because it is a better guarantee that the diversity of interests represented in plural societies achieves some recognition, but also because of the abiding uncertainty of all human projects. We never know that one particular set of ideas contains all the right answers; even if it does today, it might not be equipped to face unexpected challenges tomorrow. Monolithic doctrines that are certain that they have a monopoly of wisdom and which crush all opposition usually end by being confronted by challenges to which they have no responses in their repertoire. This was the case with Soviet communism. Neoliberal ideologues certainly show strong tendencies in that direction, but the practical realities of life in democracies force them to compromise. The links remaining between neoliberalism and the broader historical liberal tradition mean that it can respond to that challenge. This will be an important issue in its future likely transfigurations. To take the argument further we need to explore some basic ideas about the nature of markets and their limitations. This means moving to a more abstract level of analysis and coming to grips with some terms with which many readers may be unfamiliar, but which are important to a full understanding of the issues at stake. This is the task of the following Chapter.

#### Prefer our evidence – their evidence is futile intellectual pride

Saunders ‘7

Professor @ Australian Graduate School

(Peter, Adjunct Professor at the [Australian Graduate School of Management](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Graduate_School_of_Management), Why Capitalism is Good for the Soul, http://www.insideronline.org/archives/2008/spring/chap3.pdf)

Andrew Norton notes that disaffected intellectuals since Rousseau have been attacking capitalism for its failure to meet ‘true human needs.’[(26)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#26) The claim is unfounded, so what is it about capitalism that so upsets them?  Joseph Schumpeter offered part of the answer. He observed that capitalism has brought into being an educated class that has no responsibility for practical affairs, and that this class can only make a mark by criticising the system that feeds them.[(27)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#27) Intellectuals attack capitalism **because that is how they** sell books and build careers.   More recently, Robert Nozick has noted that intellectuals spend their childhoods excelling at school, where they occupy the top positions in the hierarchy, only to find later in life that their market value is much lower than they believe they are worth. Seeing ‘mere traders’ enjoying higher pay than them is unbearable, and it generates irreconcilable disaffection with the market system.[(28)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#28)  But the best explanation for the intellectuals’ distaste for capitalism was offered by Friedrich Hayek in The Fatal Conceit.[(29)](http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/summer%2007-08/saunders_summer07.html#29) Hayek understood that capitalism offends intellectual pride, while socialism flatters it. Humans like to believe they can design better systems than those that tradition or evolution have bequeathed. We distrust evolved systems, like markets, which seem to work without intelligent direction according to laws and dynamics that no one fully understands.   Nobody planned the global capitalist system, nobody runs it, and nobody really comprehends it. This particularly offends intellectuals, for capitalism renders them redundant. It gets on perfectly well without them. It does not need them to make it run, to coordinate it, or to redesign it. The intellectual critics of capitalism believe they know what is good for us, but millions of people interacting in the marketplace keep rebuffing them. This, ultimately, is why they believe capitalism is “bad for the soul”: it fulfills human needs without first seeking their moral approval.” to end at a paragraph.

#### Eradication of AIDS inevitable

**Nelson 12** (Fraser Nelson is Editor of 'The Spectator’, 8/9/2012, "Ignore the prophets of doom – this is a golden age for the world", www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/london-2012/9464410/Ignore-the-prophets-of-doom-this-is-a-golden-age-for-the-world.html)

As countries grow richer, they grow healthier. Life expectancy keeps setting new records, for both the rich and the poor world, as developments in medicine advance rapidly. Malaria deaths peaked in 2004 and even Aids deaths peaked five years ago. Anthony Fauci, America’s leading authority on the disease, said last month that there could be an “Aids-free generation” in the reasonable future. “We have no excuse, scientifically, to say we cannot do it,” he told an Aids conference in Washington. Such a statement would have been unimaginable just a decade ago. Aids remains the world’s most lethal contagious disease, responsible for almost two million deaths each year. But medicine is catching up with it. We can now dare to believe that Aids will go the way of smallpox.

## Framing

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

# 2nc

## K

### OV

#### Inequality is structured along racial lines and reformism is racist---that’s a decision rule for the ballot

**Memmi 2K** (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken **without** surcease and without **concessions**. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

### FW

#### And---prefer our framework to the stale regurgitation of fiated actions---creativity is the only chance for making debate relevant to the real world otherwise the activity will die out and lose funding---turns ALL THEIR IMPACTS

DSRB and Odekirk 12, and, well---You, in 12 (http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/04/02/the-dr-shanara-reid-brinkley/

Odekirk: What do you think, if you had an idea, if you had one wish of what you could do with scholarship in debate rounds that could come to terms with these kind of like structural, the creation of scapegoats, the ostracization of structures, the symbolization of power, the reinforcement of power through different structural things. What can we do with our scholarship, or is there anything, maybe there’s not. What can we do in terms of our debating, to come to terms with this [ed]?

Dr. Reid-Brinkley: Well, step one is do some [ed] research. If your answers to Wilderson’s afro-pessimism argument is a Wilderson indict from somebodies book review, and that’s all you got to say to Wilderson you’re an [ed] idiot. You’re an idiot. You are an idiot. And so I’m astounded looking at debate coaches who I know who do nothing but cut cards who are refusing to do research! What the!? Where are we? I thought we were good at debate. I thought we are in debate. I thought we did research, I thought that’s what sort of defined our community. So you’re telling me you can’t go find the afro-optimists who answer the afro-pessimists? It astounds me. I don’t get it. So I think step one is; shut up about complaining about framework and do some [ed] research. There is black literature being produced every moment of every day. There is a whole area of the library, sections of the stacks, with relevant information that might be useful for you. Go read some African American history, go find the little out about Africa and Chattel Slavery and the slave trade. It is so simple to me that I don’t understand why the debate community is refusing to do research.

Odekirk: Yeah, fair. Dr. Reid-Brinkley: So how about we just start there? Step 1: do some research. Odekirk: Yeah.

Dr. Reid-Binkley: Now here is the fear. If that was the only answer, the debate community would do research, but it would be just to cut cards and nothing really would change. So it can’t stop at research, but that is literally step one: go do some reading. That would really help you have a language and a vocabulary for talking when you are engaging these teams that will produce very good debates. So when people say that they don’t think that what performance/movement teams are doing is intellectual, it’s because they have already decided that they are anti-intellectual. Whereas they are very much so intellectuals, as a matter of fact they are few of the debaters in our community producing scholarship rather than regurgitating it. Our very frame of reference on how to engage in debate is about the regurgitation of information, rather than the production of it. That is where I think we have gone wrong, which is also why we are not having good – we are not able to advertise to our administrations in a way that makes debate something that administrations really really want to support and fully fund. And the reason is because we made it such this isolated solipsistic game that people who are really interested in knowledge production don’t necessarily see their relationship to it. We are losing tenure stream jobs for debate directors in our community. The reason is because our community is becoming more and more disconnected from the academy. What we can do in terms of how we produce scholarship for debate, in debate rounds, is that we need to change our focus from the regurgitation of information that is already produced in the academy to an engagement with it so that we are producing new knowledge. So rather than saying the only way you can have a plan for what to do different with democracy assistance is to find what the USFG has already defined it as, and get authors who, you have to find a solvency advocate for whatever change you are going to make. So somebody has already produced that idea and gotten it into print. Stupid! Stupid. We are so smart, this community of people, I have never been around smarter people than the people in the debate community. That’s why I find it exciting. Because I’m really smart, so I enjoy talking to other smart people. And, we are just not making use of the intelligence, the intellectual power that is at a debate tournament, especially when you get to the top of the game, it is amazingly powerful. I have met graduate students and professors that are nowhere near as smart as some of our undergraduates their senior year at the height of their ability to compete. Just have not.

Odekirk: Amen.

Dr. Reid-Brinkley: Given that this is the case, why are we not producing new knowledge? Rather than coming at a plan as I have to have a solvency advocate who has already defined this, and I have to define this in the context of exactly how the USFG has previously defined it. I think we should be producing new arguments about what democracy assistance should look like and be like through the USFG. So rather than having a solvency advocate you would have evidentiary support to change parts of your argument. Just like writing an academic paper. If all academic papers were was regurgitation of someone else’s argument, it would never get published. The whole point of academic scholarship is for you to identify what’s being said in the field or around a particular issue and what’s missing from that, and then you do something to demonstrate why that thing that’s missing in that scholarship should be there, and you make an argument about how we need to expand our understanding of this situation. Does that make sense to you? So it doesn’t make sense that the ways we in which we engage in policy making is to simply chain it out to what something else someone has already thought of. When we have all this intellectual power, we should be producing new policy. That would be the change. That would change our very way of thinking about what the game is that we are playing, and what its potential connection is to both the academy but also politics. And that would create the space for teams who want to talk about anti-blackness or teams that want to talk about the defining nature of gender and how we engage in policy. It would allow all these different things because our very frame of reference for understanding what the game is that we are engaging in would change, it would open up fields of literature, it would make sense that people are saying we need a three tier methodology where we look at organic intellectuals we look at other scholars and we look at our personal experience, guess what, that’s how you write a [ed] academic paper now.

Odekirk: Strong. Dr. Reid-Brinkley: How about you just get with the program? Odekirk: Its so obvious, but I’ve never seen it. You are so right, but I’m having a major ‘a-ha moment’ right now, to be honest. You are so [ed] right. Its also so been there my whole life, but I have literally never thought that, and.. duh. Dr. Reid-Brinkley: Yeah, that’s how I feel about it, like duh! Know what I mean? Then we have a much better argument to make to our administrations about the significance of our programs, we can start connecting debate tournament final rounds to what’s going on in public policy research institutions. What we produce could literally provide an entrance for our arguments to actually affect public policy because of the intellectual power our community holds. Why are we not making use of the things that would get our programs support? It doesn’t make sense to me. That’s why debate is collapsing to this very small small small society. Once that collapse between the NDT and CEDA happened, have you watched the community shrink over time? It just has gotten smaller. And it will continue to get smaller, because we will continue to disconnect ourselves from the academy. But why are we not in conversations on a consistent basis with our authors? Duh!? This is why whats happening in black debate. Is more fascinating than what is happening anywhere else. I’m really interested in Spurlock interviewing Spanos about debate. Im interested in the fact that Damiyr & Miguel, members of the Towson squad, me and some other black debate people got invited by Dylan Rodriguez to appear at the American Studies Conference to talk about what’s happening in debate and activism and scholarship around blackness in issues like prison, etc. I’m interested in that, because these scholars are like ‘woah, yall are talking about this stuff here?’ and they are like watching video links of the students debating, and like they’re on our Resistance homepage. I have created a Facebook Resistance page that’s private that all of the movement and its coalition members are on. So, I get requests, I put you on if you are a coalition member, Wilderson is on there, Dylan Rodriguez is on there, Sexton is on there, you know what I mean? And, we just…that’s what debate should look like. Academics should be participating, they shouldn’t control it, but you should be able to come talk to us in our theories about the topic. How about that? You don’t need to write evidence for you about the Arab Spring for me to describe to you why my work on African American culture and hip hop are relevant to thinking about what’s going on in the Arab Spring. I simply am teaching you to chain my theory through another example. That’s how you write an academic paper. You take somebody else’s theory, and you don’t just map it exactly on to what it is that you are working on. You have to figure out what the relationship is between the two. That’s the kind of stuff we could produce as a community, every year, on topics. We just are not taking advantage of that. And, in that process, because of how we have defined debate, it is exclusionary. We do have these ideal debaters who look like white males, white straight men with money and class, and those white men who don’t fit that, are few and far between. They often get up there, but they still is sort of like a little weird, because you don’t perform white masculinity middle to upper class in an appropriate manner, so they are cool with you, but you’re still freaky. We make those kinds of judgments because we are just so insulated. Our thinking is so small. Smaller than it what we should and could be. And, that’s my debate future. That’s my vision of what it could look like, my dream that lets me walk around at tournaments and be okay with the fact that supposedly I’m despised by the elites, higher-ups in the community, and people that used to be my friends, and that would speak to me on a regular basis and that I would run up to and hug, avoid my eyes in the hallway. Or that I’m not qualified to write about debate, but neither is Spanos because he was an outsider, but I’m not qualified to write about it because I’m an insider. But, Casey Harrigan, and Jarrod Atchison, and Pannetta are…there is no question of their qualifications. I’m sorry, I thought I got a PhD from the number one program in rhetoric in the country. I’m sorry, I thought that was the case. I thought I was a national award winning scholar, for my writing, published writing. I thought that was the case, and that would make me somehow qualified to talk about debate a little bit… but, clearly not. But, once your black. Once you say your black, then your biased.

#### We are impact turning Fairness with Fascism---their predictable scripts turn us into technocratic government drones totally subservient to the state---and, this is simplest K ever, all they have to do is defend Fiat---if this isn’t predictable nothing is

Richard Delgado, ’92 (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)

It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated, and duped. n1 It is even more important to know when we are unwittingly doing this to ourselves -- when we are using shopworn legal scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting nowhere. n2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to rebut other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence -- "The plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No -- the defendant should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases," "No -- the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are administrable and safe" n3 -- frees us to focus on real-world questions that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as lawyers, law students, and legal scholars advance or retard principles we hold dear. n4 We can see where the scripts come from and, perhaps, how to write new and better ones. <Continues>

Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26

How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the stronger party -- the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date -- that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies.

What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more [\*818] likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols -- by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytelling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives. n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37

<continues>

I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories do matter, we can easily expend too much energy replicating predictable, scripted arguments -- and in this way, the law turns once-progressive people into harmless technocrats. n70

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